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I. INTRODUCTION 
On February 21, 2017, one month and one day after the 
inauguration of Donald Trump as the forty-fifth President of the 
United States, the Washington Post debuted a new slogan: 
“Democracy Dies in Darkness.”1 This phrase draws on our country’s 
tradition of recognizing the importance of a free and open press,2 
but is it still true? In today’s world, does the media still play a 
fundamental role as a check on our government? Furthermore, in 
areas like immigration law, where considerable power and deference 
lies with the President and Department of Homeland Security, what 
1. Joe Concha, The Washington Post: ‘Democracy Dies in Darkness’, THE HILL
(Feb. 22, 2017, 11:12 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/media/320619-the-
washington-post-democracy-dies-in-darkness [https://perma.cc/GUR2-5EE4]; see 
Paul Farhi, The Washington Post’s New Slogan Turns out to be an Old Saying, 




2. See Stephen J. Shapiro, One and the Same: How Internet Non-Regulation
Undermines the Rationales Used to Support Broadcast Regulation, 8 MEDIA L. & POL’Y 1, 2 
(1999). 
2
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is the role of the “Fourth Estate” in holding governmental 
institutions accountable? 
This article examines these questions by analyzing the role of 
the press in shaping immigration policy by the Obama and Trump 
Administrations with respect to two groups: Central American 
asylum seekers—particularly unaccompanied minors and family 
units—and Syrian refugees. The article first examines how press 
coverage and public engagement served as a check on the Obama 
Administration and shaped President Obama’s response to the 
Central American Migrant Crisis and Syrian Refugee Crisis during 
his second term.3 The article then describes executive actions taken 
by the Trump Administration that adversely impacted Central 
American asylum seekers and Syrian refugees, and analyzes how 
media coverage shaped the Trump Administration’s ability to 
implement policies against these groups.4 
II. TWO HUMANITARIAN CALAMITIES: CENTRAL AMERICAN MIGRANT
CRISIS AND SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS 
In his second term, President Obama faced two humanitarian 
emergencies: the Central American Migrant Crisis and the Syrian 
Refugee Crisis. There were a number of external factors that 
influenced the Obama Administration’s response to these events, 
the most obvious being the proximity of the Central American 
Migrant Crisis at the southern border. The available data suggests 
that media coverage did play a role in President Obama’s response. 
A. Central American Migrant Crisis 
In the summer of 2014, the Obama Administration faced a crisis 
along the southern border.5 While the total number of illegal 
crossings remained historically low,6 the spring and summer of 2014 
3. See infra Part II.
4. See infra Part III.
5. See Richard Cowan, Waves of Immigrant Minors Present Crisis for Obama,
Congress, REUTERS (May 28, 2014, 8:26 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
usa-immigration-children/waves-of-immigrant-minors-present-crisis-for-obama-con 
gress-idUSKBN0E814T20140528 [https://perma.cc/3MJE-XCS5] (“Tens of 
thousands of children unaccompanied by parents or relatives are flooding across 
the southern U.S. border illegally, forcing the Obama administration and Congress 
to grapple with both a humanitarian crisis and a budget dilemma.”). 
6. The total number of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) apprehensions
at the southern border in FY 2014, typically used as an indicator of the total number 
3
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saw a surge of unaccompanied minors and family units with children 
from Central America apprehended at the border.7 
For President Obama—who was hoping to pass comprehensive 
immigration reform or, at minimum, use executive action to expand 
protections for undocumented immigrants through the Deferred 
Action for Parents of American and Lawful Permanent Residents 
(DAPA) program8—this crisis could not have happened at a worse 
time.9 With midterm elections only a few months away, the Obama 
of illegal crossings, was 479,371, on par with the historically low number 
of apprehensions since FY 2010. See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., DEP’T 
OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. BORDER PATROL TOTAL MONTHLY APPREHENSIONS (FY 2000–
FY 2017) (Dec. 2017), https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/ 
2017Dec/BP%20Total%20Monthly%20Apps%20by%20Sector%20and%20Area%
2C%20FY2000-FY2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RS9-A36H]. 
7. In the third quarter of FY 2014 (April–June 2014), CBP apprehended a
total of 35,563 individuals traveling as family units (often women with 
small children) and 28,904 unaccompanied minors. See U.S. CUSTOMS & 
BORDER PROT., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. BORDER PATROL TOTAL
MONTHLY FAMILY UNIT APPREHENSIONS BY SECTOR (FY 2013 - FY 2017) 
(Dec. 2017), https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2016 
Oct/BP%20Total%20Monthly%20Family%20Units%20by%20Sector%2C%20FY1
3-FY16.pdf [https://perma.cc/UEN3-92RE]; see also Press Release, Jeh Johnson, 
Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Statement About Situation Along the Southern 
Border (Sept. 8, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2014/09/08/statement-
secretary-johnson-about-situation-along-southwest-border [https://perma.cc/4XH 
9-APRD]. 
8. On November 20, 2014, DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson issued a
memorandum directing DHS to extend deferred action protections to parents of 
U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents who continuously resided in the U.S. 
since January 1, 2010, in a program known as DAPA. See Memorandum from Jeh 
Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. to León Rodriguez, Dir., U.S. 
Citizenship &  Immigr. Servs. et al. 4 (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/ 
default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/R5JZ-DT64]. The memorandum also expanded protections under the Deferred 
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. See id. at 3–4. 
9. In an interview on NBC’s Meet the Press on September 7, 2014, when
questioned on his decision to delay any executive action on immigration until after 
the midterm elections, President Obama acknowledged that the Central American 
Migrant Crisis made it difficult, politically, to move forward with these planned 
measures, stating: 
Not only do I want to make sure that the T’s are crossed and the I’s are 
dotted, but here’s the other thing, Chuck, and I’m being honest now, 
about the politics of it. This problem with unaccompanied children that 
we saw a couple weeks ago, where you had from Central America a surge 
of kids who are showing up at the border, got a lot of attention. And a 
lot of Americans started thinking, “We’ve got this immigration crisis on 
4
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Administration made the pragmatic decision to take a hardline 
approach and eliminate the problem as quickly as possible—
prioritizing the quick return of Central Americans and deterring 
future migration above all else.10 However, after months of negative 
media coverage and outcry from immigration advocates, the Obama 
Administration ultimately adopted a more humane approach toward 
Central American women and children apprehended at the 
border.11 
1. Cause of the Central American Migrant Crisis – Background on
the Northern Triangle
In recent years, the Central American countries of Guatemala, 
Honduras, and El Salvador (collectively known as the “Northern 
Triangle”) have experienced a dramatic uptick of violence, largely at 
the hands of violent gangs and drug cartels.12 Between 2005 and 
2015, over 150,000 people in the Northern Triangle were 
murdered.13 According to data from the World Bank, in 2015, El 
Salvador had the highest homicide rate per capita with a staggering 
our hands.” And what I want to do is when I take executive action, I want 
to make sure that it’s sustainable. 
Interview by Chuck Todd, Political Director, NBC News, with Barack Obama, U.S. 
President (Sept. 4, 2014), in NBC NEWS: MEET THE PRESS, https://www.nbcnews. 
com/meet-the-press/president-barack-obamas-full-interview-nbcs-chuck-todd-n197 
616 [https://perma.cc/7XZL-7VPR]; see Paul Lewis & Dan Roberts, Democrats Tell 
Obama: Drop Immigration Reform to Save Senate, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 5, 2014, 1:35 
PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/05/obama-pressure-democr 
ts-abandon-immigration-reform [https://perma. cc/W9F8-FLFC]. 
10. Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, The Obama
Administration’s Government-Wide Response to Influx of Central American 
Migrants at the Southwest Border (Aug. 1, 2014) [hereinafter August 2014 
Immigration Press Release], https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2014/08/01/obama-administration-s-government-wide-response-influx-cent 
ral-american- [https://perma.cc/4P2Y-2LTC]. 
11. See infra Part II.A.4.
12. Suchit Chavez & Jessica Avalos, The Northern Triangle: The Countries That
Don’t Cry for Their Dead, INSIGHT CRIME (Apr. 23, 2014), https://www.insightcrime 
.org/news/analysis/the-northern-triangle-the-countries-that-dont-cry-for-their-dea 
d/ [https://perma.cc/BMW5-PDDX]. 
13. Intentional Homicide, Counts and Rates per 100,000 Population, U.N. OFF. ON
DRUGS & CRIME, https://data.unodc.org/#state [https://perma.cc/5H4F-5DP8] 
(follow “Crime and Criminal Justice” hyperlink; then follow “Homicide” hyperlink; 
then follow “Homicide counts and rates (2000-2015)” hyperlink; then select “Run 
Report”) (last visited June 20, 2018). 
5
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108.64 killing deaths per 100,000, and Honduras had the second 
highest rate with 63.75 deaths per 100,000.14 While no data is 
available for Guatemala from 2015, in 2014, Guatemala had the 
seventh highest murder rate per capita with 31.21 deaths per 
100,000.15 
At the root of the high homicide rate in the Northern Triangle 
is the marked uptick in violent activity by the Mara Salvatrucha 
(MS-13), the 18th Street Gang, and other sophisticated criminal 
enterprises.16 In many parts of Guatemala, El Salvador, 
and Honduras, these gangs are able to operate with 
impunity—terrorizing citizens, demanding bribes, and engaging in 
“forced recruitment” of young residents, particularly teenage boys.17 
According to a 2012 report by the U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), an estimated 54,000 Northern Triangle residents are 
members of either the MS-13 or the 18th Street Gang.18 
Women and girls in the Northern Triangle are also at increased 
risk of violence and death.19 In Honduras, gender-based violence, 
including domestic violence, is the second highest cause of death for 
women of reproductive age.20 Yet, perpetrators in Honduras are 
rarely brought to justice.21 El Salvador’s justice system routinely fails 
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RES. SERV., GANGS IN CENTRAL AMERICA
5–7 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34112.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XR6-
CNSE]; see also U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, WOMEN ON THE RUN: FIRST-HAND
ACCOUNTS OF REFUGEES FLEEING EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, HONDURAS, AND MEXICO
16 (2015), http://www.unhcr.org/5630f24c6.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PFY-AXPM]. 
17. See JESSICA JONES & JENNIFER PODKUL, WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N, FORCED
FROM HOME: THE LOST BOYS AND GIRLS OF CENTRAL AMERICA 9–13 (Oct. 15, 2012) 
[hereinafter WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMMISSION REPORT–CENTRAL AMERICA], 
https://www.womensrefugeecommission.org/component/zdocs/document?id=84
4-forced-from-home-the-lost-boys-and-girls-of-central-america [https://perma.cc/ 
M8J6-CEF9] (follow “Forced From Home: The Lost Boys and Girls of Central 
America” hyperlink). 
18. U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME IN CENTRAL
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: A THREAT ASSESSMENT 27–28 (2012), 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-andanalysis/Studies/TOC_Central_Am 
erica_and_the_Caribbean_english.pdf [https://perma.cc/JFY2-5CEM]. 
19. WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMMISSION REPORT–CENTRAL AMERICA, supra note 17, at
9–13. 
20. Id. at 10.
21. While homicide was the second highest cause of death for Honduran
women in 2010, perpetrators were largely unpunished. See id. Between 2005 and 
2010, 96 percent of all reported femicide cases went uninvestigated and 
6
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to prosecute femicides and other crimes against women, despite the 
brutal nature of these crimes.22 In Guatemala, the dramatic increase 
in violent crimes against women and femicide has risen to epidemic 
levels, with the United Nations and other NGOs expressing serious 
concerns over the spiraling rates of rape, torture, and murder of 
women.23 Equally troubling, several NGOs have reported that the 
MS-13, the 18th Street Gang, and other cartels are committing 
systematic physical and sexual abuse against women in the Northern 
Triangle.24  
By 2014, the instability in the Northern Triangle spilled across 
the southern border of the United States. In fiscal year (FY) 2014, 
there were a total of 479,371 individuals apprehended along the 
U.S.-Mexico border, with a dramatic surge in apprehensions of 
Central Americans from the Northern Triangle.25 Of particular note, 
unprosecuted. See id.; see also Annie Kelly, Honduran Police Turn a Blind Eye To 
Soaring Number of ‘Femicides’, THE GUARDIAN (May 28, 2011), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/29/honduras-blind-eye-femicides 
[https://perma.cc/6B9Y-FJKS]. 
22. IMMIGR. & REFUGEE BD. OF CAN., EL SALVADOR: VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN,
INCLUDING NON-DOMESTIC SEXUAL VIOLENCE, LEGISLATION, STATE PROTECTION AND
SUPPORT SERVICES (2015), http://www.refworld.org/docid/560b8b294.html 
[https://perma.cc/BA6C-NYAJ]. 
23. See Karen Musalo & Blaine Bookey, Crimes Without Punishment: An Update on
Violence Against Women and Impunity in Guatemala, 10 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 
265, 269–73 (2013), https://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/ 
Musalo_Bookey_CrimesWithoutPunishment_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FQH-
D7RH]. See generally U.N. General Assembly, Annual Report of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights: Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights on the Activities of Her Office in Guatemala, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/19/21/Add.1 (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ 
HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session19/A.HRC.19.21.Add.1_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4UB7-7UZA] (providing an overview of the “human rights 
situation in Guatemala” in 2011).  
24. See RIBANDO SEELKE, supra note 16, at 6. See generally KIDS IN NEED OF
DEFENSE, NEITHER SECURITY NOR JUSTICE: SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE AND
GANG VIOLENCE IN EL SALVADOR, HONDURAS, AND GUATEMALA 4–7 (2017), 
https://supportkind.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Neither-Security-nor-Justi 
ce_SGBV-Gang-Report-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/NSW4-JWL8] (examining 
the “relationship between gang violence and SGBC in El Salvador, Honduras, and 
Guatemala.”). 
25. In FY 2014, for the first time in history a majority of the apprehensions on
the southern border were non-Mexican nationals, many of whom were from the 
Northern Triangle. See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
APPREHENSION/SEIZURE STAT. (2014), https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/doc 
uments/USBP%20Stats%20FY2014%20sector%20profile.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
7
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in FY 2014, nearly half of the Northern Triangle apprehensions on 
the southern border were unaccompanied minors and family units, 
often consisting of women traveling with young children.26 
2. Initial Response by the Obama Administration to the Crisis
While conditions in the Northern Triangle would suggest that 
the rise in apprehensions reflected a humanitarian crisis that forced 
thousands to flee violence and insecurity in their homeland, to the 
Obama Administration, the surge in Central American 
apprehensions was a huge political liability.27 Mindful of the 
upcoming midterm elections and Republican rhetoric that 
President Obama was soft on border security,28 the Administration 
initially chose to take a hardline policy against Central American 
migrants in an effort to appease conservative critics and mitigate 
negative conservative media coverage of the crisis.29 Under this 
approach, the Obama Administration took the position that the 
apprehended Central Americans were “illegal migrants” who had no 
legal basis to remain in the U.S. and sought to return those 
apprehended to their home countries as quickly as possible.30 
PP8U-9YTX]. In FY 2014, there were 479,371 apprehensions, including 252,600 
“Other Than Mexican” apprehensions. See id. 
26. In FY 2014, Border Patrol apprehended a total of 61,334 guardians and
children travelling as family units and 51,705 unaccompanied minors from El 
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., DEP’T OF 




27. See infra notes 67–68.
28. Muzaffar Chishti et al., The Obama Record on Deportations: Deporter in
Chief or Not?, MIGRATION INFO. SOURCE (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.migrationpolicy. 
org/article/obama-record-deportations-deporter-chief-or-not [https://perma.cc/ 
EZM7-ZQKQ]. 
29. Amanda Sakuma, Human Rights Groups Outraged Over Obama’s Deportation
Proposal, MSNBC (June 30, 2014), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/human-rights-
groups-outraged-over-obamas-deportation-proposal#51295 [https://perma.cc/UK 
P9-YFLR]. 
30. Press Release, Jeh Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Statement
Before Senate Appropriations Committee (July 10, 2014) [hereinafter DHS Sec. 
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Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Jeh 
Johnson’s statement to the Senate Appropriations Committee on 
July 10, 2014 clearly reflected this position.31 Although Secretary 
Johnson did note the humanitarian concerns related to the surge of 
Central American apprehensions—particularly unaccompanied 
minors and family units with small children—he also referred to the 
influx of Central American “illegal migrants” who would be swiftly 
returned, stating: 
The recent and dramatic rise in illegal migration across our 
border, from Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala, 
presents a major challenge to the United States. . . . But, in 
the final analysis, our border is not open to illegal 
migration. Our message is clear to those who try to illegally 
cross our borders: you will be sent back home. We have 
already added resources to expedite the removal, without 
a hearing before an immigration judge, of adults who come 
from these three countries without children. We have 
worked with the governments of these countries to 
repatriate the adults quicker . . . . Within the last several 
months, we have dramatically reduced the removal time of 
many of these migrants. Within the law, we are sending this 
group back, and we are sending them back quicker. Then 
there are adults who brought their children with them. 
Again, our message to this group is simple: we will send you 
back. We are building additional space to detain these 
groups and hold them until their expedited removal orders 
are effectuated.32 
The approach set forth by Secretary Johnson in his testimony to 
the Senate was quickly put into action by DHS and Department of 
Justice (DOJ).33 In the spring and summer of 2014, the government 
deployed resources to the southern border to ensure the prompt 
processing and deportation of the recent arrivals through expedited 
removal proceedings.34 In these limited proceedings, individuals are 
only allowed to request asylum and present evidence that they have 
a credible fear of persecution as a defense to removal.35 Those who 
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See August 2014 Immigration Press Release, supra note 10.
34. Id.
35. See generally A Primer on Expedited Removal, AMERICAN IMMIGR. COUNCIL
(Feb. 2017), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/ 
research/a_primer_on_expedited_removal.pdf [https://perma.cc/LSB2-QD4K] 
9
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are not able to establish a credible fear of return are swiftly deported 
to their country of origin, while those able to establish a credible fear 
of persecution are permitted to stay and present an application for 
asylum before an immigration judge.36 Because of the presumption 
by the Obama Administration that a majority of newly arrived 
Central Americans did not have a viable asylum claim, credible fear 
passage rates dropped from 74 percent in May 2014 to 62 percent in 
July 2014,37 making it possible for DHS to quickly process and 
remove many of the migrants apprehended during the crisis. 
Additionally, to deter further migration from the Northern 
Triangle, DHS took the position that Central American asylum 
seekers, including family units with small children, should remain in 
detention while they pursued their asylum claims.38 This marked a 
significant shift from the Obama Administration’s 2009 policy 
directive, in place prior to the 2014 surge, which stated that it was in 
the public interest to release asylum seekers from detention after 
passing a credible fear interview.39  
To justify the Obama Administration’s actions in response to 
the Central American surge, DHS officials cited the need to create a 
deterrent effect to discourage other Central Americans from making 
the dangerous journey from Mexico to the U.S.40 Comments by 
(discussing the use of expedited removal). 
36. Id.
37. Percentage Credible Fear Screenings with Positive Finding, HUM. RTS. FIRST (Aug.
2014), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/credible-fear-grant-
rate-august-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/876R-NP7C]. 
38. In litigation challenging the detention of Central American asylum seekers,
the DHS submitted declarations from two high-ranking Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) officials. See DHS Declarations from High-Ranking Immigration 
Officers on Blanket Policy of “No Release,” AM. IMMIGR. L. ASS’N (Aug. 7, 2014) 
[hereinafter Aug. 7 DHS Declarations], http://www.aila.org/infonet/dhs-blanket-
policy-no-release [https://perma.cc/VK74-S3V8]. The declarations confirmed the 
implementation of a “no bond” or “high bond” policy limiting release of asylum 
seekers from detention, in order to deter further migration from Guatemala, 
Honduras, and El Salvador. See id. 
39. See U.S. IMMIGR & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ICE POLICY DIRECTIVE NO.
11002.1, PAROLE OF ARRIVING ALIENS FOUND TO HAVE A CREDIBLE FEAR OF
PERSECUTION OR TORTURE          ¶ 6.1 (Dec. 8, 2009) [hereinafter ICE 2009 DIRECTIVE
11002.1], https://www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/pdf/11002.1-hd-parole_of_arriving_ 
aliens_found_credible_fear.pdf [https://perma.cc/6AX3-MWV9]. 
40. In a June 30, 2014, letter to Congress, President Obama requested
additional funding to respond to the Central American Migrant Crisis to 
implement, among other measures, “an aggressive deterrence strategy focused on 
10
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Secretary Johnson and other senior DHS officials also seemed to 
reflect the presumption that none of the Central American women 
and children had a credible fear of persecution and suggested a 
desire to send them back as quickly as possible to deter additional 
migration.41 In June 2014, a senior government official told 
reporters visiting the Artesia Family Detention Center that “the goal 
is to process the immigrants and have them deported within 10 to 15 
days to send a message back to their home countries that there are 
consequences for illegal immigration.”42 
To implement these policies of mass detention and swift 
removal, DHS opened two family detention facilities in 2014 to 
detain and process women and children apprehended at the 
southern border.43 The first of these facilities opened in Artesia, New 
Mexico, in late June 2014,44 and a second facility opened two months 
later in Karnes City, Texas.45 
the removal and repatriation of recent border crossers.” Letter to Speaker of the 
House of Representatives John A. Boehner, Senate Majority Leader Harry M. Reid, 
Senate Minority Leader A. Mitchell McConnell, and House Democratic Leader 
Nancy Pelosi on Efforts To Address the Humanitarian Situation in the Río Grande 
Valley Areas of the United States-Mexico Border 2, 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 509 
(June 30, 2009); see DHS Sec. Johnson Senate Statement, supra note 30; Aug. 7 DHS 
Declarations, supra note 38. 
41. Mike Lillis, DHS Chief Defends Child Detention, THE HILL (Aug. 3, 2016, 4:37
PM), http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/290316-dhs-chief-defends-child-
detention-practices [https://perma.cc/WJD6-P8VH]. 
42. Juan Carlos Llorca, Fed Says They Will Expedite Deportations to 10-15 Days at
N.M. Facility, SEATTLE TIMES (June 26, 2014, 8:58 PM), https://www.seattle 
times.com/nation-world/fed-says-they-will-expedite-deportations-to-10-15-days-at-n 
m-facility [https://perma.cc/4JEN-3X4U]. 
43. Family Detention: The Unjust Policy of Locking Up Immigrant Mothers With Their
Children, DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, https://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/ 
issues/family-detention [https://perma.cc/N8XB-DPVD] (last visited June 20, 
2018). 
44. Alicia A. Caldwell, U.S. to Close Immigrant Detention Center in Artesia, SANTE FE
NEW MEXICAN (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.santafenewmexican.com/news/u-s-to-
close-immigrant-detention-center-in-artesia/article_056a06ab-6044-5f04-950f-822b 
22779462.html [https://perma.cc/8RS7-BXRC]. 
45. Background on Family Detention, NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR. (Jan. 2015),
http://www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/Background%
20on%20Family%20Detention.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7J5-P65A]; see Julián 
Aguilar, Immigration Detention Centers Will Continue Operating Despite Judge’s 
Ruling, TEX. TRIB. (Dec. 6, 2016, 5:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/ 
2016/12/06/immigration-detention-centers-will-continue-operat/ [https://perma 
.cc/HQ9V- RNXJ] (noting that the Karnes Family Residential Center has operated 
since August 2014). 
11
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In the first few months after the Artesia Family Detention 
Center opened, detained women and children were subjected to an 
expedited removal screening process where officers often quickly 
determined the detainee had no credible fear of persecution.46 In 
July 2014, the first month the detention center was open and 
operational, only 40 percent of the women who underwent a 
credible fear interview at Artesia were able to establish a positive 
finding of credible fear.47 By August 2014, when volunteer attorneys 
arrived at the detention center to represent women undergoing 
credible fear interviews, the interview pass rate doubled to 80 
percent.48 However, for many unrepresented women in Artesia who 
did not pass their credible fear interview, the damage was already 
done. Between June and October 2014, 306 of the 952 women and 
children processed by the Artesia Family Detention Center 
(approximately one-third) were deported.49 
For Central American unaccompanied minors, the Trafficking 
Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA) required 
that unaccompanied non-Mexican children who lacked 
authorization to enter the U.S. be transferred to the custody of the 
Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) (part of the Department of 
Health and Human Services) within seventy-two hours of 
apprehension.50 After being transferred to ORR custody, 
46. See Jude Joffe-Block, Families That are Deported After Crossing the Boarder
Say They Return Home Feeling Hopeless and Desperate, PUB. RADIO INT’L (Sept. 4, 2014, 
4:30 PM), https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-09-04/families-are-deported-after-
crossing-border-say-they-return-home-feeling-hopeless [https://perma.cc/Y7X9-
976U] (reporting that migrants “are held in detention and placed in expedited 
removal proceedings” and “must prove they have a credible fear of persecution”). 
Karen Tumlin, an attorney with the National Immigration Law Center, explained 
that at the Artesia Family Detention Center, there is a “rush to judgment to deport 
as many [of] these women and kids as quickly as possible.” Id. 
47. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FAMILY




49. See Melinda Henneberger, When an Immigration Detention Center Comes to a
Small Town, WASH. POST (Oct. 1, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/st 
oryline/wp/2014/10/01/when-an-immigration-detention-center-comes-to-a-small-
town/?utm_term=.c56e9e31a6bd [https://perma.cc/S2VV-FM7Z]. 
50. 8 U.S.C. § 1232(b)(3) (2013); OFF. REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, U.S. DEPT. OF 
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN, https://www.acf.hhs.gov/ 
orr/programs/ucs [https://perma.cc/PR8X-DN6Y] (last visited June 20, 2018). 
12
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unaccompanied minors are typically placed in a temporary shelter 
while ORR contracted caseworkers identify a sponsor—typically a 
parent, family member, or family friend residing in the U.S.—who 
can take custody of the unaccompanied minor while the minor goes 
through removal proceedings before an immigration judge.51 In the 
summer of 2014, citing a lack of existing resources to deal with the 
surge of unaccompanied minors at the border, ORR opened three 
large temporary facilities for unaccompanied minors on Lackland 
Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas; Fort Sill Army Base in 
Oklahoma; and Port Hueneme Naval Base in Ventura, California.52  
While Central American unaccompanied minors were exempt 
from expedited removal proceedings and had more protections 
than adults and family units apprehended at the southern border in 
FY 2014, President Obama set the expectation that a majority of the 
unaccompanied minors would also be quickly returned, stating: 
In recent weeks, we’ve seen a surge of unaccompanied 
children arrive at the border . . . . The journey is 
unbelievably dangerous for these kids. The children who 
are fortunate enough to survive it will be taken care of while 
they go through the legal process, but in most cases that 
process will lead to them being sent back home.53 
Although treatment of the different subgroups of Central 
Americans apprehended in FY 2014 slightly varied, each approach 
shared a common goal—swift removal and return of the recent 
Central American arrivals and deterrence of further migration from 
Central America.54 However, as negative coverage of the Central 
51. See generally OFF. OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., CHILDREN ENTERING THE UNITED STATES UNACCOMPANIED: SECTION 2 (Jan. 30, 
2015), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/children-entering-the-united-states-
unaccompanied-section-2 [https://perma.cc/Q3K7-C2VN] (summarizing the 
timely release process of “children who are apprehended in the United States 
without a parent or legal guardian available to provide care and custody without 
immigration status”). 
52. Sarah Bronstein, Unaccompanied Children at Our Border: Why They Are Coming,




53. Remarks on Immigration Reform 1, 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 504 (June
30, 2014). 
54. See, e.g., Emily Bazelon, Who Gets to Stay?, SLATE (Sept. 12, 2014, 6:04 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/09/immig
13
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American Migrant Crisis unfolded throughout the second half of FY 
2014 and into FY 2015, the Obama Administration was forced to 
recalibrate its response to the crisis along the southern border.55 
3. Media Coverage of the Central American Migrant Surge and
Public Response
When the Obama Administration rolled out its initial strategy 
for addressing the Central American Migrant Crisis, it was met with 
a corresponding surge in media coverage that was largely critical of 
the Administration’s approach.56 Between June 2014 and August 
2014 alone, US media outlets published over 3,000 stories about 
Central American family detention, unaccompanied minors, and 
family units with children.57 The initial coverage in June and July of 
rants_seeking_asylum_courts_say_yes_for_domestic_violence_no_for_gang.html 
[https://perma.cc/LEQ9-F9LU] (chronicling the evolving treatment of victims 
of domestic violence as a migrant subgroup by the U.S. Board of Immigration 
Appeals); Lauren Carasik, The American “Deportation Mill,” BOSTON REV. 
(Sept. 9, 2014), http://bostonreview.net/us/lauren-carasik-artesia-fletc-immigrant 
[https://perma.cc/6HC7-6S44] (quoting U.S. Homeland Security Secretary Jeh 
Johnson saying, “Our message to [Central American migrants] is simple: we will 
send you back” and outlining the “Obama administration’s aggressive deportation 
regime[‘s]” plan to process and deport immigrants within ten to fifteen days). 
55. See, e.g., Sibylla Brodzinsky & Ed Pilkington, US Government Deporting Central
American Migrants to Their Deaths, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 12, 2015, 8:57 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/oct/12/obama-immigration-deport 
ations-central-america [https://perma.cc/5BTF-A3U9]; Julie Hirschfeld Davis, U.S. 
to Admit More Central American Refugees, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/27/us/politics/obama-refugees-central-amer 
ica.html [https://perma.cc/4Y2Y-8MU7] (reporting the Obama administration’s 
broadening of rules was the result of “years of complaints from advocates for 
immigrants”); Michael Martinez et al., Growing Protests Over Where to Shelter 
Immigrant Children Hits Arizona, CNN (July 16, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/ 
07/15/us/arizona-immigrant-children/index.html [https://perma.cc/BGA5-
YSQD]. 
56. See Abraham F. Lowenthal, Obama and the Americas: Promise,
Disappointment, Opportunity, 89 FOREIGN AFF. 110, 115 (July/Aug. 2010), 
https://docslide.net/documents/obama-and-the-americas-promise-dissapointmen 
t-opportunity.html/ [https://perma.cc/LK5J-JJWM] (discussing some media 
outlets’ critical treatment of the Obama Administration’s plan). 
57. PROQUEST, https://search.proquest.com/ (follow “Change Databases”
hyperlink; then expand “Global Newsstream” and check only “US Newsstream”; 
then select “Use Selected Database”; then follow “Advanced Search” hyperlink; then 
type “Central America!” AND “Unaccompanied” OR “Family Detention” in the first 
text box (quotations included); then select from the “Publication date” dropdown 
14
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2014 largely focused on the large number of Central Americans 
apprehended and emergency resources deployed to the border58 
and the shortcomings of the Administration’s response.59 
Much of the initial reporting criticizing the Administration 
focused on conditions at facilities holding unaccompanied children 
and family units with small children.60 Many of these stories 
documented how unaccompanied children were being held in 
unsanitary and overcrowded facilities,61 in violation of the TVPRA 
requirement that children must be transferred to ORR custody 
within seventy-two hours of apprehension.62 Images of large crowds 
of young children packed into holding rooms at detention facilities, 
broadcasted nightly on cable news during the height of the surge, 
shocked Americans across the country.63 Legal advocates also raised 
“Specific date range…”; then enter the date range June 1, 2014–August 31, 2014; 
then select “Search” button) (last visited June 20, 2018). 
58. See ADAM ISACSON ET AL., WASH. OFF. LATIN AMERICA, MEXICO’S OTHER
BORDER: SECURITY, MIGRATION, AND THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS AT THE LINE WITH
CENTRAL AMERICA 3 (June 17, 2014), https://www.wola.org/analysis/new-wola-
report-on-mexicos-southern-border/ [https://perma.cc/92R6-M7N2]. 
59. See id.
60. See Benjamin Goad, Groups Cite ‘Horrific’ Conditions at Immigrant Detention
Center, THE HILL, (July 24, 2014, 3:17 PM), http://thehill.com/regulation/adminis 
tration/213264-groups-cite-horrific-conditions-for-immigrant-detainees [https:// 
perma.cc/54YY-26K2]. See generally Christopher Nugent, Whose Children Are These? 
Towards Ensuring the Best Interests and Empowerment of Unaccompanied Alien Children, 15 
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 219 (2005) (offering background information about the plight of 
unaccompanied, undocumented alien children). 
61. See Goad, supra note 60. See generally Nugent, supra note 60.
62. A number of news stories reported that unaccompanied minors were held
by CBP and Border Patrol for days in short-term holding cells. See Ed Pilkington, ‘It 
was Cold, Very Cold:’ Migrant Children Endure Border Patrol ‘Ice Boxes’, THE 
GUARDIAN, (Jan. 26, 2015, 7:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2015/jan/26/migrant-children-border-patrol-ice-boxes [https://perma.cc/ 
L896-X98F]; James Lyall, “Welcome to Hell:” The Border Patrol’s Repeated Abuse of 
Children, HUFFINGTON POST BLOG (June 24, 2014, 10:45 PM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-lyall/welcome-to-hell-the-borde_b_55279 
67.html [https://perma.cc/C26F-7HC6]. The holding cells were known for their
cold temperatures (detainees referred to the holding cells as “hieleras,” the Spanish 
word for ice box) and crowded, unsanitary conditions. See id. 
63. Between May 1, 2014 and August 31, 2014, a search of three cable
news networks showed MSNBC aired 113 stories, MSNBC, 
http://www.msnbc.com/search/unaccompanied%20children [https://perma.cc/ 
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concerns about the conditions and lack of access to attorneys at the 
military bases in California, Texas, and Oklahoma that served as 
temporary shelters for unaccompanied minors.64 
By late July 2014, shortly after teams of volunteer attorneys 
arrived at the Artesia Family Detention Center, reports emerged that 
the family detention centers were “deportation mills.”65 The reports 
asserted that the centers violated the due process rights of detainees 
and failed to adequately consider their asylum claims.66 In addition 
to due process concerns, advocates also criticized the poor 
conditions at the Artesia facility, where women and children suffered 
physical and emotional harm due to their prolonged detention at 
the facility.67 On August 22, 2014, shortly after these reports 
emerged, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), American 
Immigration Council (AIC), National Immigration Project of the 
National Lawyers Guild (NLG), and the National Immigration Law 
Center (NILC) filed a class action suit on behalf of mothers detained 
at the Artesia facility.68 The suit, M.S.P.C. v. Johnson,69 alleged that 
the government violated mothers’ due process rights during initial 
asylum screenings and challenged the conditions at the Artesia 
facility.70 
The Obama Administration’s response to the migrant crisis also 
drew the ire of conservative media.71 Much of this coverage blamed 
BA2T-WVRQ] (last visited June 20, 2018), and CNN aired 96 stories each discussing 
the surge of unaccompanied children at the border CNN, 
http://www.cnn.com/search/?q=unaccompanied%20children&size=10&page=19
&from=180&sort=newest [https://perma.cc/2EQC-B2TB] (last visited June 20, 
2018). 
64. Bronstein, supra note 52.
65. See Henneberger, supra note 49.
66. See id.; see also Wil S. Hylton, The Shame of America’s Family Detention
Camps, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/ 
magazine/the-shame-of-americas-family-detention-camps.html [https://perma.cc/ 
29SW-FXDL]. 
67. See Eleanor Acer, Immigrant Families not Treated Properly, ALBUQUERQUE J.
(Aug. 3, 2014, 12:05 AM), https://www.abqjournal.com/439865/immigrant- 
families-not-treated-properly.html [https://perma.cc/3ACC-LBGM]; Goad, supra 
note 60. 
68. Complaint for Injunctive & Declaratory Relief, M.S.P.C. v. Johnson, No.
1:14-cv-01437 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 2014). 
69. M.S.P.C. v. Johnson, No. 1:14-cv-01437 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 2014).
70. Complaint for Injunctive & Declaratory Relief, supra note 68.
71. See, e.g., Nebraska Gov, Illinois Senator Say White House Sending Illegal Immigrant
Children to Their States Without Notice, FOX NEWS (July 13, 2014), 
16
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the surge on President Obama’s weak record on immigration and 
border security,72 and several Republican officials argued that the 
2012 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program 
encouraged unaccompanied minors to come to the U.S. and seek 
amnesty.73 
Though the Obama Administration attempted to take tough 
and swift action to appease conservative critics before the 2014 
midterm elections, in the end, neither conservatives nor liberals 
approved of President Obama’s handling of the Central American 
Migrant Crisis. Conservatives viewed the rise in Central American 
apprehensions as reflective of President Obama’s soft stance on 
border security and were not satisfied with the Administration’s 
response.74 Conversely, the expansion of family detention and lack 
of due process for Central Americans seeking asylum alienated 
President Obama’s liberal base.75 By July 2014, polling showed that 
the Obama Administration’s approach to the crisis was widely 
unpopular, with 58 percent of respondents disapproving of 
President Obama’s response to the border crisis.76  
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/07/13/nebraska-governor-illinois-senator 
-say-white-house-secretly-sending-illegal.html [https://perma.cc/U8LM-4JQL]. 
72. See, e.g., Daily Caller, ICE Ends Use of ‘Alien’ in Reference to Child Immigrants,
ˆFOX NEWS (July 4, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/07/04/ice-
ends-use-alien-in-references-to-child-immigrants.html [https://perma.cc/D8TG-
XJ7H]. 
73. See, e.g., ]; Molly Hennessy-Fiske & Richard Simon, Republicans Blame Obama
Policies for Immigration Crisis on Border, L.A. TIMES (June 19, 2014), 
http://beta.latimes.com/nation/la-na-immigration-border-20140620-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/9RY5-YXT5]; Amanda Sakuma, GOP Takes Border Crisis out on 
DREAMers, MSNBC NEWS (July 21, 2014, 4:20 PM), http://www.msnbc. 
com/msnbc/gop-takes-border-crisis-out-dreamers [https:// perma.cc/JZ3J-8FDZ. 
74. According to a July 2014 CNN poll, the Central American Migrant Crisis
quickly shifted public opinion toward a more hawkish view on immigration, 
particularly for Republicans, with over 75 percent of Republicans responding that 
the main focus of U.S. immigration policy should be “border security” versus “legal 
status for immigrants.” See Paul Steinhauser, CNN Poll: Border Crisis Impacting Public 
Opinion on Immigration, CNN (July 24, 2014, 5:01 PM) http://politicalticker.blogs 
.cnn.com/2014/07/24/cnn-poll-border-crisis-impacting-public-opinion-on-immigr 
ation/ [https://perma.cc/G9GN-E6PP].  
75. Acer, supra note 67.
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4. Obama Administration’s Evolving Position on Family Detention
After the political failure of President Obama’s initial response 
to the Central American migrant surge, legal challenges to family 
detention, and pressure from immigrant rights organizations and 
progressives, the Obama Administration eventually adopted a more 
humane approach toward the crisis. On September 5, 2014, several 
weeks after M.S.P.C. v. Johnson was filed in federal court, DHS sent a 
team of senior officials to monitor the situation in Artesia.77 By mid-
September, the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security 
acknowledged the concerns and promised to quickly address any 
issues during the detainees asylum proceedings.78 
On November 18, 2014, two weeks after the 2014 midterm 
elections, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
announced that it would close the Artesia detention facility,79 and on 
December 18, 2014, the facility closed.80 While the suit and negative 
coverage did result in the closure of the Artesia detention facility, 
this did not mark the end of long-term family detention of Central 
American women and children.81 Instead, the women and children 
detained at Artesia were transferred to an even larger newly opened 
family detention facility in Dilley, Texas82 and long-term detention 
of Central American women and children continued into 2015.83 
On January 6, 2015, less than a month after the Artesia 
detention facility closed, the ACLU filed a second class action suit 
on behalf of detained mothers and children at the Karnes and Dilley 
77. Plaintiffs’ Notice of Voluntary Dismissal at 2, M.S.P.C. v. Johnson, No. 1:14-
cv-01437-ABJ (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2015). 
78. Id. at 2–3.
79. Lauren Villagran, Artesia Immigrant Detention Center Closes, ALBUQUERQUE J.
(Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.abqjournal.com/516099/abqnewsseeker/artesia-
immigrant-detention-center-closes.html [https://perma.cc/D359-CNNC]. 
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., Claudia Morales, Families Crossing the Border: ‘We Are Not Criminals,’
CNN (Nov. 2, 2016, 1:13 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/02/us/family-imm 
igration-detention-centers/index.html [https://perma.cc/DA4U-GZHB]; The 
Editorial Board, Mr. Obama’s Dubious Detention Centers, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/18/opinion/mr-obamas-dubious-detention-c 
enters.html [https://perma.cc/3ER9-95GB]. 
82. U.S. IMMIGR & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ICE’S NEW 
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family detention facilities: R.I.L-R. v. Johnson.84 The ACLU brought 
this suit to challenge DHS’s blanket “no-release” policy.85 This policy 
involved detaining nearly all Central American asylum seekers who 
had passed their credible fear interview pending adjudication of 
their asylum claims.86 The purpose of this policy was to deter future 
immigration to the United States from Central America.87 On 
February 2, 2015, the ACLU filed a second action—on behalf of 
children being held in family detention facilities with their 
parents—to enforce the government’s obligations under the 1997 
Flores v. Reno settlement agreement governing the detention and 
release of immigrant children.88  
On February 20, 2015, the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the 
government from using deterrence of future migration as the sole 
or primary basis for the DHS policy of detaining family units “while 
their asylum claims were [being] processed.”89 After this preliminary 
injunction, the DHS began making individualized determinations90 
concerning  detainees’ eligibility for release on parole or bond.91 On 
84. Class Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 5, R.I.L-R. v.
Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164 (D.D.C. 2015) (No. 1:15-cv-00011). 
85. Id. at 3.
86. Id. at 2.
87. Id. at 1 (“DHS applies the No-Release Policy . . . in order to deter other
Central American migrants from coming to the United States.”). 
88. The 1997 Flores Settlement Agreement set nationwide criteria for the
detention, release, and treatment of immigrant children. Family Detention & the 
Flores Settlement, WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N & LUTHERAN IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE
SERVS. (2017), https://www.womensrefugeecommission.org/images/zdocs/Flores-
Settlement-and-Family-Detention-July-2015.pdf [https://permia.cc/QVJ2-S7WU]. 
The Agreement requires government officials to release children from custody 
“without unnecessary delay” and to a parent or legal guardian, if possible. Id. If a 
minor cannot be released because of a significant public safety or flight risk 
concern, he or she must be held in the least restrictive setting, typically a non-secure 
facility licensed by a child welfare organization. Id. Plaintiffs filed a motion to 
enforce the Flores Settlement Agreement for children detained with a parent in a 
family detention facility and to prohibit children’s long term detention in family 
detention centers. Id. 
89. R.I.L-R. v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 190 (D.D.C. 2015).
90. See ICE July 2015 Family Detention Announcement, NAT’L IMMIGR. JUST. CTR.
(July 13, 2015), http://immigrantjustice.org/ice-july-2015-family-detention-
announcement [https://perma.cc/B5YS-X8FB] (describing the individualized 
approach “going forward” that ICE planned to utilize after abandoning the DHS’s 
“general deterrence” policy). 
91. See RILR. v. Johnson, ACLU (July 31, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/
19
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May 13, 2015, in response to the district court’s order and ongoing 
negative media coverage, ICE issued a statement announcing that 
the agency would no longer use deterrence of future migration as 
the basis for denying parole or bond to detained family units who 
had passed a credible fear interview.92 The May 2015 ICE statement 
also announced a series of measures aimed at improving conditions 
at the family detention centers and shortening the detention time 
for family units.93 
But these improvements did not come quickly enough for 
Democratic congressional leaders. On May 27, 2015, 136 Democratic 
members of the House of Representatives sent a letter to DHS 
Secretary Jeh Johnson expressing concerns about the continuing 
long-term detention of parents and children and demanding an end 
to long-term detention at family detention centers.94 This was 
followed by a June 1, 2015, companion letter to Secretary Johnson, 
signed by 33 Senate Democrats.95 
After a year of negative coverage of the Central American 
Migrant Crisis, impact litigation challenging family detention, and 
vocal opposition within President Obama’s own party, the Obama 
Administration decided to end long-term family detention.96 On 
cases/rilr-v-johnson [https://perma.cc/MW2S-AW6T] (“[ICE] issued a policy that 
it would not consider general deterrence in its detention decisions for families.”). 
92. U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ICE 
ANNOUNCES ENHANCED OVERSIGHT FOR FAMILY RESIDENTIAL CENTERS (May 13, 2015), 
https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ice-announces-enhanced-oversight-family-resi 
dential-centers [https://perma.cc/4FWE-5CRQ]. 
93. Id. (stating ICE’s intention to “further enhance . . . conditions” at “family
residential centers” and that “because of the sensitive and unique nature of 
detaining adults with children, ICE will also implement a review process for any 
families detained beyond 90 days, and every 60 days thereafter”). 
94. Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives, 136 House Dems–Letter to
DHS Sec. Johnson on Family/Child Detention (May 27, 2015), 
https://lofgren.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=397944 [htt 
ps://perma.cc/5AR7-VD5M]. 
95. Letter from U.S. Senators to Jeh Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec.
(June 1, 2015 https://www.aclu.org/letter/us-senate-sign-letter-dhs-secretary-
johnson-family-detention [https://perma.cc/4HEE-ZN2P]. 
96. AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, A GUIDE TO CHILDREN ARRIVING AT THE BORDER: LAWS,
POLICIES, AND RESPONSES 10 (June 26, 2015), https://www.american 
immigrationcouncil.org/research/guide-children-arriving-border-laws-policies-and 
-responses [https://perma.cc/L9Z2-77R9] (“In 2014 and 2015, several detained 
families filed lawsuits to challenge various aspects of family detention.”); Tom Dart, 
Child Migrants at Texas Border: An Immigration Crisis That’s Hardly New, THE GUARDIAN
(July 9, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/09/us-immigration-
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June 24, 2015, Secretary Johnson issued a statement announcing a 
dramatic shift in policy with respect to family detention, stating: 
I have reached the conclusion that we must make 
substantial changes in our detention practices with respect 
to families with children. In short, once a family has 
established eligibility for asylum or other relief under our 
laws, long-term detention is an inefficient use of our 
resources and should be discontinued.97 
Under the new policy set forth by Secretary Johnson, families 
who established a credible fear of persecution were promptly 
released on bond or an alternative to detention (such as an ankle 
monitor)98 pending adjudication of their asylum claim.99 Secretary 
Johnson also directed DHS officials to complete credible fear 
interview screening for detained family units “within a reasonable 
timeframe” to ensure their prompt release.100 A month later, Judge 
Dolly Gee of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of 
California issued a ruling that long-term detention of family units 
with minor children violated the Flores Settlement Agreement, 
codifying Secretary Johnson’s directive into a court order.101 
undocumented-children-texas [https://perma.cc/2JWA-2D3K] (describing the 
“humanitarian crisis” of immigrants fleeing Central America and the “crowded . . . 
[and] unsanitary conditions” in family detention centers). 
97. See Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Statement by Sec’y Jeh
Johnson on Family Residential Ctrs. (June 24, 2015), https://www.dhs.gov/news/ 
2015/ 06/24/statement-secretary-jeh-c-johnson-family-residential-centers [https:// 
perma.cc/9PTA-H7BX]. Secretary Johnson’s statement also noted that the Family 
Detention Center in Dilley, Texas, would remain open, but would only serve as a 
short-term processing center to complete credible fear screenings and to process 
families for release on parole or bond. Id. 
98. LUTHERAN IMMIGR. & REFUGEE SERV., FAMILY DETENTION RELEASE AND





 101. The 1997 Flores Settlement Agreement governs the minimum standards 
for the detention, release, and treatment of minors. Stipulated Settlement 
Agreement at 3, Flores v. Reno, CV 85-4544-RJK(Px) (C.D. Cal. 1997). Judge Gee, 
in the 2015 enforcement action, found that the family detention centers (Dilley, 
Texas; Karnes, Texas; and Berks, Pennsylvania) failed to meet such minimum 
standards. Flores v. Johnson, 212 F. Supp. 3d 864, 878 n.9 (C.D. Cal. 2015). The 
obligations set forth in this ruling require that detention of family units comply with 
the Flores settlement, and are subject to court order. See Holly Fuhrman, The Flores 
Ruling and the Possible End to Family Detention, HUM. RTS. FIRST (Aug. 3, 2015), 
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While issues do still arise,102 since June 2015, the vast majority of 
family units apprehended and held at a family detention center have 
undergone a credible fear screening and are released within twenty 
days of arrival, marking a drastic improvement from the initial 
response in the summer of 2014.103 
B. Syrian Refugee Crisis and Response from the United States 
As the Central American Migrant Crisis was unfolding in 2014 
and 2015, the world was facing a second humanitarian crisis in 
Syria.104 In comparison to the Central American Migrant Crisis, 
President Obama’s response in 2015 to the Syrian Refugee Crisis 
represented the values of his liberal base and clearly reflected lessons 
learned from the Central American Migrant Crisis.105 
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/blog/flores-ruling-and-possible-end-family-dete 
ntion [https://perma.cc/JBQ2-7VR5]; Julia Preston, Judge Orders Release of Immigrant 
Children Detained by U.S., N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/07/26/us/detained-immigrant-children-judge-dolly-gee-ruling.html [https:/ 
/perma.cc/H3KJ-QMNP]. Further, unlike Secretary Johnson’s directive, these 
obligations under the Flores settlement created by Judge Gee’s July 2015 order are 
binding, and therefore cannot be reversed by subsequent Administrations. 
 102. Since early 2017, there have been several reports that DHS is considering 
separating family units apprehended at the border. See generally infra Part III.B.3. 
 103. See generally Valeria Gomez & Karla Mari McKanders, Refugee Reception and 
Perception: U.S. Detention Camps & German Welcome Centers, 40 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 523, 
538–39 (2017) (describing credible fear screening and release processes for family 
units detained at the Southern Family Residential Center in Dilley, Texas). 
 104. See generally Syria: The Story of the Conflict, BBC NEWS (Mar. 11, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868 [https://perma.cc/F488-
8ABU] (outlining the events that transpired in Syria to create a crisis prior to early 
2016). 
 105. Compare Laura Koran, Obama: Refugee Crisis is Test of Our Humanity, CNN 
(Sept. 20, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/20/politics/obama-refugees-
summit/index.html [https://perma.cc/K7RW-3KU3] (describing President 
Obama’s impassioned call “to alleviate a global refugee crisis of epic proportions”), 
with Russell Berman, The New Crackdown on Migrant Families,  ATLANTIC (Jan. 5, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/01/the-obama-administratio 
ns-crackdown-on-central-american-migrants/422550/ [https://perma.cc/CMH4-
PXF7] (noting one of the former President’s critics as saying, “[The Obama 
Administration is] treating a [Central American] refugee crisis as an immigration 
enforcement issue”). 
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1. The Syrian Refugee Crisis – General Background
The root of the Syrian Refugee Crisis can be traced to the Syrian 
Civil War, which began in 2011 as an uprising against the regime of 
Bashar al-Assad.106 While the protests and uprising in Syria were 
initially viewed as a part of the Arab Spring that swept other Arab 
nations in early 2011, the Syrian uprising quickly descended into a 
bloody civil war.107 By June 2013, two years into the civil war, the 
United Nations estimated that over 90,000 Syrians had been killed 
in the conflict.108 Further complicating matters was the rise of the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) within Syria.109 By 2014, ISIS 
seized control of significant portions of Syria.110 
Between the violence of the civil war and the rise of ISIS, 
thousands of Syrians were forced to flee their homeland and seek 
refuge in the neighboring countries of Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt, 
Iraq, and Jordan.111 By March 2013, the United Nations High 
Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) reported that one million 
Syrians had registered as refugees in neighboring countries.112 Six 
months later, in September 2013, the total number of registered 
Syrian refugees doubled to two million.113 According to statistics 
 106. Kathy Gilsinan, The Confused Person’s Guide to the Syrian Civil War, ATLANTIC 
(Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/syri 
an-civil-war-guide-isis/410746/ [https://perma.cc/525L-2WK6]. 
107. Id. 
 108. Nearly 93,000 People Killed in ‘Vicious’ Syria Conflict–UN Human Rights 
Chief, U.N. NEWS CTR. (June 13, 2013), http://www.un.org/apps/news/ 
story.asp?NewsID=45162#.Wh8U3egrLIU [https://perma.cc/3RS6-MUA7]. 
109. See generally The Rise and Fall of ISIL Explained, ALJAZEERA (June 20, 2017), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/06/rise-fall-isil-explained-1706 
07085701484.html [https://perma.cc/W3JV-2AL4] (providing a generalized 
history of ISIS’s development and its current status as of mid-2017). 
 110. See id. (“By 2014, ISIL had taken Mosul from a defeated Iraqi army, as well 
as Raqqa and oil-rich Deir Az Zor in Syria.”). 
 111. Mona Chalabi, Syrian Refugees: How Many Are There and Where Are They?, THE 
GUARDIAN (July 25, 2013, 2:30 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/news/ 
datablog/2013/jul/25/syrian-refugee-crisis-in-numbers-updated [https://perma. 
cc/7UPV-A75B]. 
112. Adrian Edwards, ed. Leo Dobbs, Number of Syrian Refugees Reaches 1 
Million Mark, UNHCR (Mar. 6, 2013), http://www.unhcr.org/en-
us/news/latest/2013/3/513625ed6/number-syrian-refugees-reaches-1-million-mar 
k.html [https:// perma.cc/6RKK-QLJR].
113. Adrian Edwards, Number of Syrian Refugees Tops 2 Million Mark with More on
the Way, UNHCR (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2013/ 
9/522495669/number-syrian-refugees-tops-2-million-mark-way.html [https://perm 
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from the UNHCR, as of December 2017, there are approximately 5.4 
million registered Syrian refugees worldwide.114 
Given the high number of displaced Syrian refugees, the 
UNHCR, other NGOs, and the host countries had difficulty raising 
sufficient humanitarian funds to meet the basic needs of this refugee 
population.115 By 2014, there were widespread reports of 
malnutrition and disease, including cases of polio within Syrian 
refugee populations in Iraq and Lebanon.116 With resources spread 
thin, neighboring countries began to place limits on accepting new 
refugees.117 In October 2014, the New York Times reported that 
Jordan closed its borders to new Syrian refugees,118 and in January 
2015, Lebanon implemented visa restrictions on new Syrian refugee 
arrivals.119 
By late 2013, in response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis, a number 
of European Union countries made a commitment to accept a 
a.cc/YQ7C-JPYX].
114. Syria Regional Refugee Response: Inter-Agency Information Sharing Portal,
UNHCR, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php [https://perma.cc/ 
DDD8-452T] (last visited June 20, 2018). 
 115. See Chalabi, supra note 111 (stating that the UN has received only about 38 
percent of the funds required to address the needs of refugees and NGOs has 
received a small fraction of the funding needed to meet needs on the ground, with 
the World Food Program only receiving 17 percent and the International Medical 
Corps only receiving 7 percent of required funds). 
 116. Sam Jones, UN Brands Polio Outbreak in Syria and Iraq ‘Most Challenging 
in History’, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 28, 2014, 3:00 PM), https://www. 
theguardian.com/global-development/2014/mar/28/un-polio-syria-iraq-most-cha 
llenging-history [https://perma.cc/R7DS-WRUM]; see First Case of Polio Suspected 
Among Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, NBC NEWS (Mar. 11, 2014, 10:53 AM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/syrias-children/first-case-polio-suspected-am 
ong-syrian-refugees-lebanon-n49811 [https://perma.cc/7EQP-5N8C]. 
 117. Jack Redden, UNHCR Says it is “Stretched to the Limit” by the Rising Number of 
Refugees, UNHCR (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2013/ 
10/524ae6179/unhcr-says-stretched-limit-rising-number-refugees.html [https:// 
perma.cc/RK7H-6RZL] (quoting UN High Commissioner for Refugees António 
Guterres, stating “UNHCR and its partners are doing everything possible to 
respond, but we are stretched to the limits by this combination of an emergency 
unparalleled in the recent past, and the persistence of other crises around the 
world”). 
 118. Rana F. Sweis, No Syrians Are Allowed into Jordan, Agencies Say, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 8, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/09/world/middleeast/syrian-
refugees-jordan-border-united-nations.html [https://perma.cc/PW7S-M5VD]. 
 119. Syrians Entering Lebanon Face New Restrictions, BBC NEWS (Jan. 5, 
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30657003 [https://perma. 
cc/HHZ5-8DD2]. 
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limited number of Syrian refugees for resettlement.120 Germany led 
this effort, committing to accept 5,000 refugees in 2013.121 
Because of deteriorating conditions in refugee camps and the 
news that Western European nations were willing to accept Syrian 
refugees, many displaced Syrians, along with other migrants from 
Afghanistan and sub-Saharan Africa, began crossing the 
Mediterranean by boat to seek asylum in Europe.122 By the end of 
2014, the situation had reached a crisis point: over 280,000 migrants, 
including nearly 80,000 Syrians, entered the Euro Zone without 
authorization,123 with 77 percent of these migrants entering by sea.124 
Although the U.S. did commit significant foreign humanitarian 
aid to address the refugee crisis125 and provided military aid to 
combat ISIS in Syria,126 the United States’ initial commitment to 
resettle Syrian refugees was relatively modest compared to its 
European counterparts.127 Between FY 2013 and FY 2015, the U.S. 
resettled a total of 1,873 Syrian refugees.128 But with one shocking 




 122. Patrick Kingsley, Desperate Syrian Refugees Risk All in Bid to Reach Europe, THE
GUARDIAN (Sept. 18, 2014, 2:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/global-develop 
ment/2014/sep/18/desperate-syrian-refugees-europe-mediterranean [https:// 
perma.cc/484N-RLP6]. 




 124. Id. at 18. (explaining that there were 219,476 detected migrants crossing 
by sea and a total of 283,532 illegal border crossing in 2014). 
 125. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, U.S. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN
RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.state.gov/j/prm/ 
releases/factsheets/2017/269469.htm [https://perma.cc/WD27-NJTD]. 
 126. Syria Crisis: Where Key Countries Stand, BBC NEWS (Oct. 30, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23849587 [https://perma.cc/LZ7Z-
TWB4]. 
 127. Nicole Ostrand, The Syrian Refugee Crisis: A Comparison of Responses by 
Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States, 3 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM.
SEC. 255, 270 (2015) (detailing the number of Syrian asylum applications and 
acceptance by country). 
 128. OFF. REFUGEE SETTLEMENT, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FY 
2015 SERVED POPULATIONS BY STATE AND COUNTRY OF ORIGIN (REFUGEES ONLY)
(Apr. 22, 2016), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/fy-2015-refugees-by-state-
and-country-of-origin-all-served-populations [https://perma.cc/M8RZ-4KPU] (pr-  
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photo, the Syrian Refugee Crisis gripped the American public, 
resulting in the Obama Administration taking swift action in support 
of admitting more Syrian refugees into the U.S. 
2. Media Coverage of Syrian Refugee Crisis and Response from the
United States
As the Syrian Refugee Crisis unfolded between 2012 and 2015, 
there was considerable worldwide coverage of this emerging 
humanitarian crisis. In 2014, there were 17,256 stories in the 
international press covering the Syrian Refugee Crisis.129 By 
comparison, during the same period, only 7,560 stories covering the 
Syrian Refugee Crisis appeared in the American press in 2014,130 and 
approximately 30 percent of 2014 U.S. coverage of the Syrian 
Refugee Crisis focused, in part, on U.S. military efforts against ISIS 
in Syria.131 
oviding ORR statistics showing a total of 1,693 refugees from Syrian were resettled 
in the U.S. in FY 2015); OFF. OF REFUGEE SETTLEMENT, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., FISCAL YEAR 2013 REFUGEE ARRIVALS (Feb. 11, 2015), 
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/fiscal-year-2013-refugee-arrivals [https:// 
perma.cc/T3ES-22YJ] (providing ORR statistics showing a total of forty-eight 
refugees from Syrian were resettled in the U.S. in FY 2013); OFFICE REFUGEE
SETTLEMENT, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FISCAL YEAR 2014 REFUGEE
ARRIVALS (Feb. 11, 2015), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/fiscal-year-2014-
refugee-arrivals [https://perma.cc/3ETT-EQKW] (providing ORR statistics 
showing a total of 132 refugees from Syrian were resettled in the U.S. in FY 2014). 
 129. PROQUEST, https://search.proquest.com/ (follow “Change Databases” 
hyperlink; then expand “Global Newsstream” and check only “Canadian 
Newsstream,” and “Global Breaking Newswires,” and “International Newsstream”; 
then select “Use Selected Databases”; then follow “Advanced Search” hyperlink; 
then type “Syria” AND “Refugee” in the first text box (quotations not included); 
then select from the “Publication date” dropdown “Specific date range…”; then 
enter the date range January 1, 2014–December 31, 2014; then select “Search” 
button) (last visited June 20, 2018). 
 130. Id.  (follow “Change Databases” hyperlink; then expand “Global 
Newsstream” and check only “US Newsstream”; then select “Use Selected Database”; 
then follow “Advanced Search” hyperlink; then type “Syria” and “Refugee” in the 
first text box (quotations not included); then select from the “Publication date” 
dropdown “Specific date range…”; then enter the date range January 1, 2014–
December 31, 2014; then select “Search” button) (last visited June 20, 2018). 
 131. See id. (click on “publications”; then check only “US Newsstream” database; 
then click “Advanced Search”; then enter search terms “Syria” AND “Refugee” and 
“ISIS” (quotations not included); then select from the “Publication Date” 
dropdown, “Specific date range. . .”; then enter the date range January 1, 2014–
December 31, 2014) (last visited June 20, 2018) (finding that after searching “ISIS” 
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On September 2, 2015, the U.S. public swiftly turned its 
attention to the Syrian Refugee Crisis when an image of a drowned 
toddler—Alan Kurdi, washed up on the shore near Bodrum, 
Turkey—was circulated by the media.132 The photo of Kurdi’s lifeless 
body immediately went viral after it was tweeted by Peter Bouckaert, 
Emergencies Director at Human Rights Watch,133 quickly becoming 
the global symbol of the Syrian Refugee Crisis. In explaining why he 
shared the photo on social media, Bouckaert touched on why the 
image was so powerful, stating: 
What struck me the most were his little sneakers, certainly 
lovingly put on by his parents that morning as they dressed 
him for their dangerous journey. One of my favorite 
moments of the morning is dressing my kids and helping 
them put on their shoes. They always seem to manage to 
put something on backwards, to our mutual amusement. 
Staring at the image, I couldn’t help imagine that it was one 
of my own sons lying there drowned on the beach.134 
After the image of Alan Kurdi went viral, coverage of the Syrian 
Refugee Crisis surged throughout the United States. Between 
September 2, 2015—the day Bouckaert discovered Kurdi’s body on 
the Turkish shore—and September 10, 2015, United States news 
sources published 1,656 stories about the Syrian Refugee Crisis.135 By 
way of comparison, in the nine day period prior to the publication 
within the data set of the 7,560 of U.S. articles published on the Syrian Refugee 
Crisis in 2014, 2,167 also discuss ISIS). 
 132. Olivier Laurent, What the Image of Aylan Kurdi Says About the Power of 
Photography, TIME (Sept. 4, 2015), http://time.com/4022765/aylan-kurdi-photo/ 
[https://perma.cc/X6CJ-K4GA] (“As [the images of Aylan Kurdi’s body] spread, 
and as individuals and organizations faced the decision of whether and how to 
publish them, those pictures have ignited a new kind of conversation about the 
crisis.”). 
 133. Peter Bouckaert (@Bouckap), TWITTER (Sept. 2, 2015, 4:29 AM), 
https://twitter.com/bouckap/status/639037338362978304 
[https://perma.cc/F86E-JBXJ]. 
 134. Peter Bouckaert, Dispatches: Why I Shared a Horrific Photo of a Drowned Syrian 
Child, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 2, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/ 
09/02/dispatches-why-i-shared-horrific-photo-drowned-syrian-child [https://perm 
a.cc/9AQ9-MUEW].
135. PROQUEST, https://search.proquest.com/ (click on “publications”; then
check only “US Newsstream” database; then click “Advanced Search”; then enter 
search terms “Syria” AND “Refugee” (quotations not included); then select from 
the “Publication Date” dropdown, “Specific date range. . .”; then enter the date 
range September 2, 2015–September 10, 2015) (last visited June 20, 2018). 
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of the photo of Alan Kurdi—from August 24, 2015 to September 1, 
2015—only 500 stories appeared in the United States press about the 
Syrian Refugee Crisis.136 
The image appeared to quickly sway the United States public in 
favor of helping Syrian refugees. In a CNN poll taken between 
September 4, 2015, and September 8, 2015, 55 percent of 
respondents were in favor of accepting Syrian refugees, and 83 
percent of respondents were in favor of providing humanitarian aid 
to refugees.137 Public engagement in support of refugees also spiked 
in the days immediately after the photo of Alan Kurdi went viral. 
During the week of September 14, 2015, Syrian-American Activist 
George Batah delivered a change.org petition, signed by 330,000 
Americans, to the White House demanding the U.S. resettle 65,000 
Syrian refugees in FY 2016.138 
In contrast to the Administration’s response to the Central 
American Migrant Crisis a year earlier, President Obama responded 
to the groundswell of media coverage and public support for Syrian 
refugees with decisive action. On September 10, 2015, eight days 
after the photo of Alan Kurdi was published around the world, the 
Obama Administration announced its commitment to resettle a 
minimum of 10,000 Syrian refugees in the coming year.139 Later in 
the month, on September 21, 2015, the U.S. Department of State 
announced that it was providing an additional $419 million in 
humanitarian aid to assist Syrian refugees in neighboring countries 
 136. Id. (click on “publications”; then check only “US Newsstream” database; 
then click “Advanced Search”; then enter search terms “Syria” AND “Refugee” 
(quotations not included); then select from the “Publication Date” dropdown, 
“Specific date range. . .”; then enter the date range August 24, 2015–September 1, 
2015) (last visited June 20, 2018). 
 137. CNN/ORC Poll: Full Results on Migrant Crisis, CNN (Sept. 14, 2015, 1:16 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/14/politics/migrant-crisis-refugees-poll-cnn-orc/i 
ndex.html [https://perma.cc/56WU-YGTE]. 
 138. Amanda Terkel, Man Who Started Syrian Refugee Petition Invited to the White 
House, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 15, 2015, 4:37 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost. 
com/entry/george-batah-syriapetition_us_561feeaae4b050c6c4a4c76d [https:// 
perma.cc/5MA5-N7G6]; White House Asked to Help Syrian Refugees, CNN (Sept. 16, 
2015), http://www.cnn.com/videos/world/2015/09/16/exp-syrian-refugee-crisis. 
cnn [https://perma.cc/Y4BB-4NSH]. 
 139. See Remarks at the Leaders Summit on Refugees in New York City, 2016 
DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 616 (Sept. 20, 2016); Gardiner Harris et al., Obama Increases 
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displaced by the conflict.140 Following up on his commitment to 
resettle 10,000 Syrian refugees in 2016, President Obama formally 
raised the annual refugee ceiling from 70,000 to 85,000 for FY 2016 
on October 1, 2015.141   
Nonetheless, the Obama Administration faced some opposition 
to increased resettlement of Syrian refugees, particularly after the 
terrorist attack in Paris on November 13, 2015.142 In the wake of the 
Paris attack, thirty governors called on the Administration to halt the 
resettlement of Syrian refugees,143 and then-presidential candidate 
Donald Trump called for surveillance of mosques and possible 
creation of a Muslim registry.144 Yet, President Obama’s commitment 
to resettle Syrian refugees and increase refugee admissions did not 
waver—the Obama Administration exceeded its initial goal and 
resettled 12,587 Syrian refugees in FY 2016.145 In FY 2017, President 
Obama raised the ceiling on refugee arrivals to 110,000,146 marking 
 140. Carol Morello, U.S. Gives $419 Million More to Aid Syrian Refugees, 




 141. U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., Bureau of 
Population, Refugees & Migration, Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal 
Year 2016, at 5 (Oct. 1, 2015), https://www.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/247982.pdf[https://perma.cc/JJG8-9GDY]. 
 142. See, e.g., More States Say No to Syrian Refugees After Paris Attacks, CBS NEWS 
(Nov. 16, 2015), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/more-states-say-no-to-syrian-
refugees-after-paris-attacks/ [https://perma.cc/Y3U9-M74R]. 
 143. In the wake of the November 13, 2015, terrorist attack in Paris, twenty-nine 
Republican Governors and one Democratic Governor (Maggie Hassan of New 
Hampshire) publicly called on President Obama to halt plans to resettle Syrian 
refugees. See Arnie Seipel, 30 Governors Call for Halt to U.S. Resettlement of Syrian 
Refugees, NPR NEWS (Nov. 17, 2015), https://www.npr.org/2015/11/17/ 
456336432/more-governors-oppose-u-s-resettlement-of-syrian-refugees [https:// 
perma.cc/T33M-3E3K]. 
 144. Maggie Haberman & Richard Perez-Pena, Donald Trump Sets Off a Furor with 
Call to Register Muslims in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2015), https://www.nytimes 
.com/2015/11/21/us/politics/donald-trump-sets-off-a-furor-with-call-to-register-
muslims-in-the-us.html [https://perma.cc/6GEQ-SD2N]. 
 145. Jie Zong & Jeanne Batalova, Syrian Refugees in the United States, MIGRATION
POL’Y INST. (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/syrian-
refugees-united-states [https://perma.cc/XAP2-XNAP]. 
 146. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, H.R. AND LAB., BUREAU OF
POPULATION, REFUGEES & MIGRATION, PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2017, at 5 (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/262168.pdf [https://perma.cc/5K4Y-HNSV]. 
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the first time the refugee ceiling was raised above 100,000 in over 
twenty years.147 
In the end, President Obama’s September 2015 decision to 
increase Syrian refugee resettlement in response to media coverage 
and public engagement was politically popular.148 By the summer of 
2016, polling showed a majority of Americans, including an 
overwhelming majority of Democrats, supported refugee 
resettlement.149  
III. EXECUTIVE ACTIONS BY THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION IMPACTING
ASYLUM SEEKERS AT THE BORDER AND SYRIAN REFUGEES 
Unlike President Obama, a more traditional politician whose 
executive decisions on immigration policy could be swayed by media 
coverage and public opinion, President Trump’s positions on 
immigration have not materially changed since the 2016 presidential 
campaign.150 
After running on a platform of restrictionist immigration policy, 
President Trump began his first week in office by issuing three 
executive orders  on immigration: the “Border Security and 
Immigration Enforcement Improvements” Executive Order 
(“Border Security Executive Order”) on January 25, 2017;151 the 
“Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States” 
Executive Order on January 25, 2017;152 and the “Protecting the 
 147. See U.S. Annual Refugee Resettlement Ceilings & Number of Refugees Admitted, 
1980-Present, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/ 
data-hub/charts/us-annual-refugee-resettlement-ceilings-and-number-refugees-ad 
mitted-united [https://perma.cc/93W4-NUXV] (last visited June 20, 2018). 
 148. See, e.g., Juana Summers, Survey: Partisan Split Over U.S. Taking in Refugees, 
CNN (June 13, 2016, 11:48 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/13/ 
politics/syrian-refugees-poll-american-attitudes/index.html [https://perma.cc/ 
M2TW-NTGX] (citing a Brookings Institution survey indicating that 59% of 
Americans supported accepting refugees, including 77% of Democrats). 
 149. See id. (describing that in a June 2016 CNN poll, 58 percent of respondents, 
including 77 percent of Democrats, supported refugee resettlement). 
 150. See Stephen Collinson and Jeremy Diamond, Trump on Immigration: No 
Amnesty, No Pivot, CNN: POLITICS (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/ 
31/politics/donald-trump-immigration-speech/index.html [https://perma.cc/ 
56WM-KJW5]; Immigration, WHITE HOUSE.GOV, www.whitehouse.gov/issues/ 
immigration/  [https://perma.cc/E2WG-2JXX] (last visited June 20, 2018). 
151. Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 30, 2017). 
152. Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 30, 2017). 
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Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States” 
Executive Order on January 27, 2017 (“Travel Ban”).153  
Since issuing these executive orders in late January 2017, 
President Trump’s positions on the travel ban and border security 
have not been swayed by negative media coverage. Because of this, 
the role of the media has shifted to informing the public about the 
Trump Administration’s actions on immigration, spurring change 
through impact litigation and legal advocacy challenging those 
actions.154 
By signing the Travel Ban and the Border Security Executive 
Order during his first week in office, President Trump immediately 
made good on his campaign promises and set forth immigration 
policies far more restrictionist than any of his predecessors.155 Both 
of these executive orders had an immediate impact on Syrian 
refugees and Central American asylum seekers, but only the Travel 
Ban was quickly halted through litigation.156 As a contrast to Part II, 
which examined how media coverage swayed immigration policy 
during the Obama Administration, Part III examines the Trump 
Administration’s executive action impacting Syrian refugees and 
Central American asylum seekers and how the disparate level of 
media coverage and corresponding impact litigation has affected 
President Trump’s ability to implement these actions. 
153. Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Feb. 1, 2017). 
 154. See, e.g., Matthew Cooper, The Anti-Trump Resistance: Lawyers Lead the Fight 
Against the White House, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 10, 2017, 1:06 PM), http://www.newsweek 
.com/trump-travel-immigration-ban-muslims-supreme-court-san-francisco-9th-circu 
it-555203 [https://perma.cc/RC9A-98MJ; Nick Miroff & David Nakamura, 200,000 
Salvadorans May be Forced to Leave the U.S. as Trump Ends Immigration Protection, WASH. 




155. See, e.g., Cynthia Farrar, What Donald Trump Doesn’t Get About His Own 
Immigration Story, POLITICO (Oct. 26, 2016), https://www.politico.com/ 
magazine/story/2016/10/donald-trump-immigration-story-video-214389 [https:// 
perma.cc/AM6E-X4VM]; Summer Meza, Trump’s Election Promises, Both Broken and 
Kept, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 8, 2017, 8:10 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/trump-one-
year-election-promises-kept-and-broken-704862 [https://perma.cc/V8AU-L5RF]. 
 156. See, e.g., Jaweed Kaleem, Trump’s Travel Ban Could Remain Blocked for Weeks, 
L.A. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2017, 5:21 PM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/ 
washington/la-na-essential-washington-updates-trump-s-travel-ban-could-remain-bl 
ocked-1490313567-htmlstory.html [http://perm a.cc/QL6T-UCU8] (discussing 
the litigation stalling the travel ban). 
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A. Travel Ban Executive Order 
One week after his inauguration, President Trump ignited a 
firestorm when he signed the first in a series of Travel Ban Executive 
Orders banning the admission of refugees and nationals of seven 
Muslim majority countries.157 The initial thirty-six hours after the 
first Travel Ban was issued saw chaos at our nation’s airports,158 
ultimately resulting in the first in a series of nationwide injunctions 
halting its implementation.159 
157. E.g., Trump Travel Ban Sparks Protests at Airports Nationwide, CBS NEWS (Jan. 
29, 2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/donald-trump-travel-ban-sparks-
protests-at-airports-nationwide-seattle-tacoma/ [https://perma.cc/6M55-PX8W] 
(covering just some of the domestic protests over the Executive Order, including 
those in Seattle, New York, Newark, Chicago, Denver, Dallas, Portland, San 
Francisco, San Diego, and Fairfax); Reena Flores, How Foreign Leaders Are Reacting to 
Trump’s Travel Ban, CBS NEWS (Jan. 28, 2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ 
how-foreign-leaders-are-reacting-to-trumps-travel-ban/ [https://perma.cc/YQ7Z-
4L8A] (detailing the international criticism that the ban drew including from such 
divergent countries as Iran and France). 
 158. See Jonah Engel Bromwich, Lawyers Mobilize at Nation’s Airports After Trump’s 
Order, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/29/ 
us/lawyers-trump-muslim-ban-immigration.html [https://perma.cc/KHQ8-AFMR] 
(noting the efforts of attorneys and legal aid groups to offer advice to individuals 
effected); Glenn Kessler, The Number of People Affected by the Trump Travel Ban: About 
90,000, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-  
checker/wp/2017/01/30/the-number-of-people-affected-by-trumps-travel-ban-abo 
ut-90000/?utm_term=.4c12ba04f8b9 [https://perma.cc/LVL3-3KUK] (looking at 
the lack of clarity provided for implementation with the hasty reversal by the White 
House regarding the status of entry for green card holders); Eonghan MacGuire et 
al., Trump Travel Restrictions Leave Refugees Stranded: Reports, NBC NEWS (Jan. 28, 
2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/trump-travel-restrictions-leave-refu 
gees-stranded-reports-n713591 [https://perma.cc/EPJ4-9LWK] (highlighting the 
challenges faced U.S. Customs officials due to the hasty implementation, which lead 
to detentions of peoples all ready in flight at the time of its signing). 
159. See generally Ben Jacobs, US Travel Ban Hits Major Setback as Judges Uphold 
Temporary Restraining Order, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 10, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/09/judges-deny-trump-travel-ba 
n-enforcement-uphold-order [https://perma.cc/SJW3-PJ75] (highlighting the 
Ninth Circuit’s sustainment of the injunction arising from challenges by 
Washington and Minnesota); Rachel Weiner, Federal Judge in Virginia Issues Strong 
Rebuke of Trump Travel Ban, WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/judge-in-virginia-grants-prel 
iminary-injunction-against-travelban/2017/02/13/a6164bfe-f255-11e6-a9b0-ecee7 
ce475fc_story.html?utm_term=.9e6f7b00d d53 [https://perma.cc/462E-5JTV] 
(reviewing an Eastern District of Virginia’s injunction order and specifically drawing 
emphasis to the court’s conclusion that the Executive Order likely violated the 
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After the first Travel Ban was effectively blocked by the courts, 
the Trump Administration opted to issue a revised, slightly more 
tailored version of the Travel Ban on March 6, 2017.160 The second 
version of the Travel Ban was also challenged in federal court, and 
was eventually appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court,161 where the 
case was dismissed when the March 6 order expired.162 A third 
indefinite version of the Travel Ban, issued as a Presidential 
Proclamation on September 28, 2017,163 was allowed to move 
forward on December 4, 2017, when the U.S. Supreme Court issued 
an unsigned order lifting two nationwide preliminary injunctions 
issued by the Fourth Circuit and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.164 
Litigation challenging the legality of the third Travel Ban is currently 
pending before the U.S. Supreme Court.165 
Establishment Clause). 
 160. The second version of the Travel Ban applied to nationals of six countries: 
Libya, Sudan, Iran, Somalia, Yemen and Syria. Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 
13209 (Mar. 9, 2017). Iraq, included in the original Travel Ban, was removed from 
the list of prohibited countries. Id. The second version of the Travel Ban also 
specifically exempted lawful permanent residents, individuals who were admitted or 
paroled into the U.S., individuals who had been issued a visa prior to the effective 
date of the order, dual nationals who are citizens of a non-banned country, 
diplomats, and previously admitted refugees and asylees. Id. 
 161. On June 26, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on the two 
lead cases challenging the second version of the Travel Ban. Trump v. Int’l Refugee 
Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2086–89 (2017), cert. granted, 85 U.S.L.W. 4477 
(U.S. June 26, 2017) (Nos. 16-1436 (16A1190) & 16-1540 (16A1191)) (consolidating 
two cases: Hawaii v. Trump from the Ninth Circuit and Trump v. Int’l Refugee 
Assistance Project from the Fourth Circuit). The Court also granted a stay that 
partially lifted the nationwide injunctions issued by the Fourth Circuit and Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. at 2089. In granting the partial stay, the Court 
permitted the second Travel Ban to be enforced against individuals from the six 
countries who lacked a qualifying bona fide relationship with a U.S. citizen, 
permanent resident, or U.S. entity. Id. at 2087–89. 
162. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017). 
 163. The third version of the Travel Ban contained the same exemptions as the 
second version of the Travel Ban but varied from the second version in several 
respects. See generally Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 24, 2017). 
The third version of the Travel Ban applied to six Muslim-majority countries—Iran, 
Libya, Yemen, Somalia, Chad and Syria—and two non-Muslim majority countries—
North Korea and certain officials from Venezuela. See id. at 3. Additionally, the third 
version of the Travel Ban was indefinite in nature. See generally id. 
164. See Trump v. Hawaii, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/trump-v-hawaii-3/ [https://perma.cc/Y8BE-G8YW] (last visited June 20, 
2018). 
165. See id. 
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Yet, the summary above is not the complete story, particularly in 
the case of the first version of the Travel Ban. In addition to the 
litigation challenging that version of the Travel Ban, there were a 
number of external factors (including media coverage, public 
engagement, and legal advocacy) that shaped its failed rollout. The 
sections below will examine the role of the media and the public in 
impact litigation challenging the first Travel Ban. Further, they will 
discuss the necessity of continued public engagement as litigation 
challenging later versions of the Travel Ban makes its way through 
the courts. 
1. Impact on Syrian Refugees
On Friday, January 27, 2017, President Trump signed the first 
Travel Ban Executive Order.166 The first version of the Travel Ban 
had an immediate, adverse impact on Syrian refugees, effectively 
reversing President Obama’s commitment to increase Syrian refugee 
resettlement.167 In particular, two sections of the Travel Ban 
specifically targeted Syrian refugees and other Syrian nationals 
inside and outside of the United States.168 First, section 3(c) banned 
the admission of nationals from seven countries, including Syria, in 
immigrant and nonimmigrant status for a period of ninety days.169 
Additionally, section 5 banned the admission of all refugees for a 
period of 120 days, reduced the annual ceiling of refugee admissions 
to 50,000, and banned the admission of Syrian refugees until 
sufficient changes were made to the U.S. Refugee Admissions 
Program to “ensure that admission of Syrian refugees [was] 
consistent with the national interest,”170 effectively creating an 
indefinite ban on Syrian refugees. 
166. Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017). 
167. See id. at 8978–80. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 8978. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 
“Immigrants” refer to non-citizens holding status that allows them to stay in the U.S. 
indefinitely, and “Nonimmigrants” refer to non-citizens admitted to the U.S. with a 
visa that permits them to stay for a temporary period of time pursuant to the terms 
of their visa. See INA § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (Supp. 2017). 
170. Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977, 8979–80 (Jan. 30, 2017). 
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2. Implementation of the Travel Ban Executive Order and Resulting
Media Coverage
The Travel Ban Executive Order went into effect immediately 
after President Trump signed it on the afternoon of Friday, January 
27, 2017, and airports across the country quickly descended into 
chaos. According to a New York Times article, by the evening of 
Saturday, January 28, 2017, 109 travelers in transit to the U.S. were 
denied admission in the hours after the Travel Ban was signed.171 
Meanwhile, 173 travelers were stopped before being allowed to 
board planes to the U.S.172 Other travelers, including lawful 
permanent residents, were detained for hours at airports across the 
nation as Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials attempted 
to sort out proper procedures to enforce the Travel Ban.173 In 
response, there were a number of protests at airports across the 
country as hundreds of Americans demonstrated against the ban.174 
Additionally, teams of volunteer attorneys descended on airports to 
assist travelers impacted by the Travel Ban.175 
By Saturday evening, the ACLU, along with the International 
Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP), the NILC, and Yale Law School’s 
Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization filed a suit in the 
Eastern District of New York on behalf of two impacted travelers.176 
The suit, Darweesh v. Trump, challenged the legality of the Travel Ban 
 171. Michael D. Shear et al., Judge Blocks Trump Order, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2017) 
[hereinafter Shear et al., Judge Blocks Trump Order], https://www.nytimes.com/2017 
/01/28/us/refugees-detained-at-us-airports-prompting-legal-challenges-to-trumps-
immigration-order.html [https://perma.cc/L8Y9-7GHN] . 
172. Id. 
 173. See Jonathan Allen & Brendan O’Brian, How Trump’s Abrupt Immigration Ban 
Sowed Confusion at Airports, Agencies, REUTERS (Jan. 29, 2017, 12:25 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-immigration-confusion/how-trum 
ps-abrupt-immigration-ban-sowed-confusion-at-airports-agenciesidUSKBN15D07S/ 
[https://perma.cc/M7AP-XTFB]; Evan Perez et al., Inside the Confusion of the Trump 
Executive Order and Travel Ban, CNN (Jan. 30, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2017/01/28/politics/donald-trump-travel-ban/index.html/ [https://perma.cc/ 
5WWH-9C2Q]; Matt Stevens, First Travel Ban Order Left Officials Confused, Documents 
Show, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/02/us/trump-
travel-ban.html [https://perma.cc/LR53-YDJS]. 
174. Shear et al., Judge Blocks Trump Order, supra note 171. 
175. See Jonah E. Bromwich, Lawyers Mobilize at Nation’s Airports After Trump’s 
Order, N.Y. TIMES (Jan 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/29/us/lawye 
rs-trump-muslim-ban-immigration.html [https://perma.cc/4TNQ-9WE2]. 
 176. See generally Darweesh v. Trump, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/cases/darwee 
sh-v-trump/ [https://perma.cc/A8DV-4UEL] (last visited June 20, 2018). 
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and included an emergency motion for stay to halt its further 
enforcement.177 On Saturday, January 28, Judge Ann M. Donnelly 
granted the motion for stay and declared a temporary nationwide 
injunction on the Travel Ban.178  
As these events were unfolding at airports across the country, 
there was round the clock coverage of the Travel Ban’s impact. 
Between Friday, January 27, 2017, and Sunday, January 29, 2017, 787 
stories in the U.S. media covered the Travel Ban.179 While Judge 
Donnelly’s ruling was largely due to the work of the attorneys 
representing Mr. Darweesh, the intense media coverage and scrutiny 
this case received may have played a small role in the speed with 
which Judge Donnelly issued the order temporarily halting the 
Travel Ban. 
On Monday January 30, 2017, the State of Washington filed a 
suit challenging the Travel Ban, alleging it caused injury to the state 
and its institutions.180 Several days later, on February 3, 2017, Judge 
James L. Robard issued a nationwide temporary restraining order 
(TRO) prohibiting enforcement of section 3(c) and section 5 of the 
Travel Ban.181 The Trump Administration appealed and filed an 
emergency motion to stay the TRO with the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.182 In opposition to the government’s motion for the stay of 
the TRO, the State of Washington submitted a joint declaration from 
ten former national security officials.183 The declaration argued that 
177. Id. 
178. Darweesh v. Trump, 2017 WL 388504 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2017). 
179. PROQUEST, https://search-proquest-com (follow “Change Databases” 
hyperlink; then expand “Global Newsstream” and check only “US Newsstream”; 
then select “Use Selected Databases”; then click “Advanced Search”; then enter 
search terms “Travel Ban” (quotations not included) OR “Muslim Ban” (quotations 
included); then select from the “Publication Date” dropdown, “Specific date 
range. . .”; then enter the date range January 27, 2017–February 29, 2017) (last 
visited June 20, 2018). 
 180. Washington v. Trump, 2017 WL 462040, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017), 
appeal dismissed, 2017 WL 3774041 (9th Cir. Mar. 8, 2017). 
 181. Id. at *3 (“The court concludes that the circumstances brought before it 
today are such that it must intervene to fulfill its constitutional role in our tripart 
government.”). 
 182. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1158 (9th Cir. 2017), reconsideration 
en banc denied, 853 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2017), and reconsideration en banc denied, 858 
F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2017), and cert. denied, Golden v. Washington, 138 S.Ct. 448 
(2017). 
183. See generally Joint Declaration of Madeleine K. Albright et al., Washington 
v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 17-35105) (including former
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no particular threat justified the Executive Order, and that the 
Travel Ban undermined, rather than assisted, national security.184 
Oral arguments on the government’s motion for stay before the 
Ninth Circuit were scheduled for February 7, 2017.185 Due to the 
high interest in the case, the Ninth Circuit issued an order notifying 
the public that a live audio stream of the oral arguments could be 
accessed on the court’s public website.186 On February 7, 2017, 
135,000 individuals listened to the livestreamed audio through the 
Ninth Circuit’s website, and the cable news networks CNN and 
MSNBC broadcasted the live audio of the oral argument on-the-
air.187  
On February 9, 2017, the three-judge panel of Judge William 
Canby, Jr., Judge Richard Clifton, and Judge Michelle Friedland 
issued a unanimous published decision denying the government’s 
emergency motion for a stay pending appeal, thereby upholding the 
TRO as a preliminary injunction pending adjudication of the case 
on the merits.188 On February 16, 2017, one week after the Ninth 
Circuit issued the order denying the motion for stay, the Trump 
Administration abandoned its efforts to implement the January 27 
Executive Order, opting instead to issue a revised Executive 
Order.189 In a filing in the Ninth Circuit, the DOJ explained the 
Administration’s revised position, by stating: 
Secretaries of State Madeleine K. Albright and John F. Kerry, former Secretary of 
Defense and CIA Director Leon E. Panetta, and former Secretary of Homeland 
Security Janet A. Napolitano). 
184. Id. at *2. 
 185. Order at 1, Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 17-
35105), ECF No. 77. 
186. Id. 
187. Matt Pearce, Appellate Hearing Over Trump’s Travel Ban Gets Massive Online 




188. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1169 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 189. Washington v. Trump, 855 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2017) (mem.); see Matt 
Zapotosky, Trump Says He’ll Issue a New Executive Order on Immigration by Next Week, 
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Rather than continuing this litigation, the President 
intends in the near future to rescind the Order and replace 
it with a new, substantially revised Executive Order to 
eliminate what the panel erroneously thought were 
constitutional concerns. . . . In so doing, the President will 
clear the way for immediately protecting the country rather 
than pursuing further, potentially time-consuming 
litigation. Under the unusual circumstances presented 
here—including the extraordinarily expedited 
proceedings and limited briefing to the panel, the 
complexity and constitutional magnitude of the issues, the 
Court’s sua sponte consideration of rehearing en banc, and 
respect for the President’s constitutional responsibilities—
the government respectfully submits that the most 
appropriate course would be for the Court to hold its 
consideration of the case until the President issues the new 
Order and then vacate the panel’s preliminary decision.190 
On March 6, 2017, President Trump issued a revised Executive 
Order with several key changes, including the elimination of the 
indefinite ban on Syrian refugees.191 
To those familiar with the typical timeline of federal court 
litigation, the speed of the decisions in Darweesh v. Trump and 
Washington v. Trump are remarkable. The speed with which the 
preliminary orders were rendered by the federal bench on the Travel 
Ban was principally motivated by the harm the plaintiffs would suffer 
if the Travel Ban were allowed to move forward.192 However, the 
intense media scrutiny likely had some impact on the speed of the 
proceedings. To provide a sense of the media coverage of the Travel 
Ban, between January 27, 2017, and February 27, 2017, a total of 
12,589 stories were published in U.S. media sources covering the 
Travel Ban.193 
 190. Supplemental Brief on En Banc Consideration at 4, Washington v. Trump, 
847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 17-35105). 
191. Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017). 
 192. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1168–69 (9th Cir. 2017) (“When the 
Executive Order was in effect, the States contend that the travel prohibitions 
harmed the States’ university employees and students, separated families, and 
stranded the States’ residents abroad. These are substantial injuries and even 
irreparable harms.”). 
193. PROQUEST, https://search.proquest.com/ (follow “Change Databases” 
hyperlink; then expand “Global Newsstream” and check only “US Newsstream”; 
then select “Use Selected Database”; then follow “Advanced Search” hyperlink; then 
type “Travel Ban” (quotations included) in the first text box; then select “OR” in 
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3. Use of Media Coverage to Support Litigation Challenging the
Travel Ban
The media also played an important role in exposing evidence 
that was used to support litigation challenging various versions of the 
Travel Ban. The clearest example of this was the January 28, 2017, 
Fox News interview by Jeanine Pirro of former New York City Mayor, 
Rudy Giuliani.194 When asked how President Trump selected the 
seven countries designated in the January 27, 2017, Executive Order, 
Giuliani responded: 
I’ll tell you the whole history of it. So when he [Trump] 
first announced it, he said, “Muslim ban.” He called me up. 
He said, ‘Put a commission together. Show me the right 
way to do it legally.’ I put a commission together with judge 
[Michael] Mukasey, with congressman [Mike] McCaul, 
Pete King, whole group of other very expert lawyers on this 
and what we did was we focused on—instead of religion—
danger. The areas of the world that create danger for us, 
which is a factual basis, not a religious basis. Perfectly legal. 
Perfectly sensible. And that’s what the ban is based on. It’s 
not based on religion, it’s based on places where there are 
substantial evidence that people are sending terrorists into 
our country.195 
Giuliani’s comments have been repeatedly referenced as proof 
of the Trump Administration’s intent to create a “Muslim ban.”196 
the drop down box below the text box; then type “Muslim Ban” (quotations not 
included) in the second text box; then select from the “Publication date” dropdown 
“Specific date range…”; then enter date range January 27, 2017–February 27, 2017; 
then select “Search” button) (last visited June 20, 2018). 
 194. Fox News, Judge Jeanine Pirro Rudy Giuliani FULL Interview January 28, 
2017, YOUTUBE (Jan. 31, 2017) [hereinafter Judge Pirro & Rudy Giulani 
Interview], https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8jb3fo6jGbo [https://perma.cc/ 
R7N4-HC2B]; see Loulla-Maw Eleftheriou-Smith, Donald Trump Asked Rudy Giuliani 
How to ‘Legally’ Create ‘Muslim Ban’, Claims Former New York Mayor, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 
30, 2017, 10:21 AM), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/ 
donald-trump-muslim-ban-rudy-giuliani-how-legally-create-islam-us-immigration-en 
try-visa-new-york-a7552751.html [https://perma.cc/JA7F-XJKY]. 
 195. Eleftheriou-Smith, supra note 194; see Judge Pirro & Rudy Giulani Interview, 
supra note 194. 
 196. See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Motion For A Preliminary Injunction And/Or 
Temporary Restraining Order of the Executive Order & Memorandum of Law In 
Support Thereof at 7, Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp.3d 539 
(D. Md. Mar. 11, 2017) (No. 8:17-cv-00361-TDC) (“[T]wo days after the original 
Executive Order was issued, Rudolph Giuliani, an advisor to President Trump, 
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They have also allowed the courts to look beyond the four corners 
of the Executive Order when determining if an Establishment Clause 
argument would succeed on the merits.197 Additionally, the media’s 
reporting on Trump campaign events, where Candidate Trump 
promised a “complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United 
States,” and tweets by the President expressing anti-Muslim 
sentiment have been used to support an Establishment Clause claim 
against the Travel Ban.198 Even after the Trump Administration 
issued revised versions of the Travel Ban on March 6, 2017 and 
September 28, 2017 that were more facially neutral than the original 
January 27, 2017, Executive Order, these earlier comments continue 
to be cited in ongoing litigation as evidence of the President’s true 
intent in implementing the ban.199 
While the attorneys may have been able to present other 
evidence in support of an Establishment Clause claim, the media 
record of the contemporaneous comments of President Trump and 
his associates clearly made it easier to establish their case.200 Between 
the amount of coverage and the role of the press in exposing 
evidence in support of an Establishment Clause claim, the media 
continues to play an important part in shaping the outcome, to date, 
in the ongoing Travel Ban litigation.201 
stated that then-candidate Trump had asked Mr. Giuliani for help in ‘legally’ 
creating a ‘Muslim ban’; that in response, Mr. Giuliani and others decided to use 
territory as a proxy; and that this idea was reflected in the signed Order.”). 
 197. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp.3d 539, 558–59 (D. 
Md. Mar. 11, 2017). 
 198. E.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 6–7, Washington v. 
Trump, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 30, 2017) (No. 2:17-cv-00141) 
(containing allegations of statements made by presidential candidate Trump, 
including a statement on December 7, 2017 calling for “a total and complete 
shutdown of Muslims entering the United States”); see Ariane de Vogue, How Donald 
Trump’s Tweets are Helping to Fight His Travel Ban, CNN (Feb. 15, 2017, 2:14 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/15/politics/trump-twitter-travel-ban/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/YZ7G-7N7A]. 
 199. Ariane de Vogue, Judges in Travel Ban Case Concerned About Trump Tweets, 
CNN (Dec. 8, 2017, 2:55 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/12/08/politics/travel-
ban-trump-tweets/index.html [https://perma.cc/4YFU-MT4X]. 
 200. Hawaii v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1139 (D. Haw. 2017) (considering 
previous comments made by President Trump and concluding that “the Court 
emphasizes that its preliminary assessment rests on the peculiar circumstances and 
specific historical record present[ed] here.”). 
 201. Michael D. Shear et al., Supreme Court Cancels Hearing on Previous Trump 
Travel Ban, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/ 
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In subsequent months, media coverage of the Travel Ban and 
impact litigation challenging the two later versions of the Travel Ban 
waned.202 Because the impact of newer versions of the Travel Ban is 
playing out overseas at U.S. consular posts instead of in the airports, 
it is difficult to hold the public’s attention on this issue.203 
Nonetheless, as impact litigation challenging the third indefinite 
version of the Travel Ban makes its way through the courts, media 
coverage and public engagement will be critical to illuminate the 
impact on nationals of the named countries and harm to their 
relatives and business ties in the U.S. 
B. Border Security Executive Order and Department of Homeland Security 
Memorandum 
While it is clear that increased media coverage can shape the 
course of impact litigation challenging Presidential executive action 
on immigration, what happens when that coverage is lacking? Unlike 
the Travel Ban and the Border Security Executive Order, subsequent 
09/25/us/politics/trump-travel-ban-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/TM9 
T-LY8N] (discussing critics of the Travel Ban “point[ing] to Mr. Trump’s history of 
calling for a ban on Muslim entry into the United States”). 
 202. Between February 28, 2017 and December 1, 2017, a total of 17,062 stories 
were published by U.S. News Sources about the Travel Ban. PROQUEST,
https://search.proquest.com/ (follow “Database” hyperlink; then expand “Global 
Newsstream” and check only “US Newsstream”; then select “Use Selected Database”; 
then follow “Advanced Search” hyperlink; then type “Travel Ban” OR “Muslim Ban” 
(quotations included) in the second text box; then select from the “Publication 
date” dropdown “Specific date range…”; then enter date range February 28, 2017–
December 1, 2017; then select “Search” button) (last visited June 20, 2018). The 
total number of news stories over this nine month period was only slightly higher 
than the number of stories (12,589) published about the Travel Ban in the one 
month period immediately after the first Travel Ban was signed by President Trump. 
Id. (follow “Change Databases” hyperlink; then expand “Global Newsstream” and 
check only “US Newsstream”; then select “Use Selected Database”; then follow 
“Advanced Search” hyperlink; then type “Travel Ban” (quotations not included) OR 
“Muslim Ban” (quotations included) in the second text box; then select from the 
“Publication date” dropdown “Specific date range…”; then enter date range January 
27, 2017–February 27, 2017; then select “Search” button) (last visited June 20, 
2018). 
 203. See, e.g., U.S. has Begun Fully Implementing Trump Travel Ban: State Dept., 
REUTERS (Dec. 8, 2017, 11:13 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
immigration-ban/u-s-has-begun-fully-implementing-trump-travel-ban-state-dept-id 
USKBN1E22CB [https://perma.cc/NXC2-PAE6] (discussing President Trump’s 
newer Executive Order as “calling for ‘enhancing vetting capabilities’ at U.S. 
embassies and consulates overseas”). 
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agency actions on the border and the impact on asylum seekers 
received comparatively little media attention and were allowed to 
move forward with minimal pushback.204 
Nearly one year into the Trump Administration, legal advocates 
began filing suits against the Trump Administration, challenging 
actions and policies by the Administration implemented under the 
January 2017 Border Security Executive Order.205 Nevertheless, one 
cannot help but wonder if these legal challenges would have 
commenced earlier had there been more national media coverage 
of the Trump Administration’s efforts to implement the Border 
Security Executive Order along with other actions against Central 
American asylum seekers on the southern border. 
1. Impact to Central American Asylum Seekers
During his first week in office, President Trump issued the 
Border Security Executive Order, setting forth a number of policy 
goals and administrative changes governing immigration 
enforcement along the southern border.206 
Section 1 of the Border Security Executive Order states that the 
purpose of the order is to “direct executive departments and 
agencies . . . to deploy all lawful means to secure the Nation’s 
southern border, to prevent further illegal immigration into the 
United States, and to repatriate illegal aliens swiftly, consistently, and 
humanely.”207 Yet, as the Obama Administration learned with its 
initial response to the Central American Migrant Crisis, the swift 
repatriation of apprehended aliens could be deemed unlawful if the 
 204. Harvard Releases Report on Effect of Trump’s Executive Orders on Asylum Seekers, 
HARV. L. TODAY (Feb. 8, 2017), https://today.law.harvard.edu/harvard-releases-
first-report-effect-trumps-executive-orders-asylum-seekers/ 
[https://perma.cc/K3FH-CBQR] (“In the wake of the executive orders, media 
attention has focused largely on the travel ban involving seven predominantly 
Muslim nations, but the impact of the orders on asylum seekers from around the 
world has received little attention.”). 
 205. Ryan Devereaux, U.S. Illegally Denying Immigrants Their Right to Seek Asylum 
at the Mexican Border, According to Lawsuit, INTERCEPT (Nov. 16, 2017, 1:38 PM), 
https://theintercept.com/2017/11/16/immigration-asylum-seekers-denied-borde 
r-entry-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/3S2W-AA8P] (discussing legal actions filed 
against the Trump Administration in California and Texas stemming from the 
Border Security Executive Order). 
206. Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017). 
207. Id. at 8793 (emphasis added). 
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government denies an individual the opportunity to pursue an 
asylum claim.208 
Five sections of the Border Security Executive Order contain 
language that, if enacted as written, would have a significant negative 
impact on Central American asylum seekers. The first of these, 
sections 5 and 6, call for expanded detention of apprehended 
immigrants pending outcome of their removal proceedings209 and 
allocation of resources to construct new detention facilities along the 
southern border.210 Section 7 directs DHS to return individuals 
apprehended to the last country of passage while their removal 
proceedings are waiting to be heard by an immigration judge.211 
Even more problematic, section 11 aims at eliminating “the abuse of 
parole and asylum provisions,” calling for more stringent screening 
of asylum seekers during the credible fear assessment and imposing 
significant limitations on parole of asylum seekers who have passed 
their credible fear screenings.212 Lastly, section 13 directs the 
Attorney General to “establish prosecution guidelines . . . to ensure 
that Federal prosecutors accord a high priority to prosecutions of 
offenses having a nexus to the southern border,” including increased 
criminal prosecution for illegal entry.213 
On February 20, 2017, several weeks after the issuance of the 
Border Security Executive Order, DHS issued an implementation 
memo (DHS Border Security Memo) providing guidance on how the 
agency should implement the Executive Order.214 The DHS Border 
 208. As noted above, on August 22, 2014, at the height of the Central American 
Migrant Crisis, the ACLU, AIC, NLG, and NILC filed a class action suit, M.S.P.C. v. 
Johnson, on behalf of mothers detained at the Artesia detention facility. See supra 
note 68 and accompanying text. The suit alleged that the government violated 
mothers’ due process rights during initial asylum screenings and failed to properly 
consider their asylum claims during the credible fear process. See supra note 69–70 
and accompanying text. This lawsuit was dismissed by motion of the plaintiffs after 
DHS properly addressed the alleged due process violations and closed the Artesia 
Detention Center. See supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text. 
209. Id. at 8795. 
210. Id. at 8794–95. 
211. Id. at 8795. 
212. Id. at 8795–96. 
213. See id. at 8796. 
214. Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec., to Kevin 
McAleenan et al., Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Protection, 
Implementing the President’s Border Security and Immigration Enforcement 
Improvements Policies 1 (2017) [hereinafter DHS Border Security Memo], 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Implementing
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Security Memo provided further guidance on procedures for asylum 
screening, limits on parole, and increased prosecutions.215 It also 
included new language describing the possible expansion of 
expedited removal and measures limiting protections for 
unaccompanied minors.216 
With respect to asylum seekers, section I of the DHS Border 
Security Memo sets forth a seemingly more stringent standard for 
passing a credible fear interview, stating that “an alien must 
demonstrate that there is a ‘significant possibility’ that the alien 
could establish eligibility for asylum.”217 In its analysis of the Border 
Security Executive Order and DHS Border Security Memo, the 
Migration Policy Institute expressed concerns about the “significant 
possibility of establishing eligibility for asylum” credible fear 
standard, particularly for Central Americans, noting: 
DHS also states that determinations should include 
consideration of the statistical likelihood that the claim 
would be granted by an immigration judge. Asylum 
grant rates for Central Americans in immigration court 
are among the lowest of any national-origin group . . . . 
This . . . indicates that credible fear and reasonable fear 
determination standards will be tightened, making 
it more difficult for asylum seekers to lodge claims after 
they are apprehended to the border.218 
In contrast, the DHS Border Security Memo guidelines for 
parole determinations and detention of asylum seekers are 
considerably more moderate than the language contained in the 
Border Security Executive Order.219 Of note, section A of the DHS 
Border Security Memo confirmed that DHS would continue to 
release individuals on parole “[w]hen required to do so by statute, 
-the-Presidents-Border-Security-Immigration-Enforcement-Improvement-Policies.p 
df [https://perma.cc/MY3J-PES6]. 
215. See id. at 2–12. 
216. See id. 
217. Id. at 8 (quoting INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v) 
(Supp. 2017)). 
 218. FAYE HIPSMAN & DORIS MEISSNER, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, TRUMP
EXECUTIVE ORDER AND DHS IMPLEMENTATION MEMO ON BORDER ENFORCEMENT: A
BRIEF REVIEW (2017), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/trump-executive-
order-and-dhs-implementation-memo-border-enforcement-brief-review [https:// 
perma.cc/MDR7-XWMT] (select “Download Brief”). 
 219. Compare Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017), with 
DHS Border Security Memo, supra note 214. 
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or to comply with a binding settlement agreement or order issued by 
a competent judicial or administrative authority.”220 This would allow 
for the ongoing release of Central American family units, in 
accordance with the Flores settlement. Additionally, section K of the 
DHS Border Security Memo states that the 2009 Obama 
Administration policy directive to grant parole to arriving aliens 
seeking asylum who pass a credible fear of persecution screening and 
pose no security, safety, or flight risk221 remains in effect pending 
further changes or directives by the DHS Secretary.222  
The additional sections of the DHS Border Security Memo 
directly impacting Central Americans are sections L and M, relating 
to the processing of unaccompanied minors. Section L of the DHS 
Border Security Memo states that “[a]pproximately 60% of minors 
initially determined to be ‘unaccompanied alien children’ are 
placed in the care of one or more parents illegally residing in the 
United States,” implying that unaccompanied minors placed in the 
custody of a parent should not continue to be afforded protections 
under TVPRA.223 Additionally, section M contains harsh language 
against parents who facilitate the smuggling of their children to the 
U.S. and directs ICE and CBP to “ensure the proper enforcement of 
our immigration laws against any individual who—directly or 
indirectly—facilitates the illegal smuggling or trafficking of an alien 
child into the U.S.”224 
Taken together, all of the proposed measures set forth in the 
Border Security Executive Order and accompanying DHS Border 
Security Memo have the potential to dramatically change the way 
asylum seekers are processed along the southern border. Given the 
large number of unaccompanied minors and family units from the 
Northern Triangle apprehended along the southern border every 
year, these measures have the potential to impact tens of thousands 
of people fleeing violence and may dramatically decrease their 
ability to present a successful asylum claim.  
220. DHS Border Security Memo, supra note 214, at 2. 
221. See ICE 2009 DIRECTIVE 11002.1, supra note 39. 
222. DHS Border Security Memo, supra note 214, at 9–10. 
223. Id. at 10–11. 
224. Id. at 11. 
45
Pottratz Acosta: Sunlight is the Best Disinfectant: The Role of the Media in Shapi
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2018
  
848 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:3 
2. Disparate Level of Media Coverage of the Border Security Executive
Order
While a lack of appropriated congressional funds has prevented 
the Border Security Executive Order goals of constructing a wall and 
detention facilities along the border, other measures not requiring 
funding or new regulations did move forward.225 Additionally, like 
the Travel Ban, there are portions of the Border Security Executive 
Order and actions taken by the Administration to implement these 
directives that could be deemed unlawful if challenged in court.226 
However, in contrast to the Travel Ban, impact litigation challenging 
the Trump Administration’s actions along the border has been slow 
to follow. 
One possible reason why there has been limited impact 
litigation challenging the Trump Administration’s implementation 
of the Border Security Executive Order is the limited media coverage 
highlighting potentially unlawful conduct at the border. Unlike 
press coverage of the Travel Ban, with over 12,000 stories published 
in the month after it was issued,227 only 626 stories were published in 
 225. See, e.g., id. at 3 (discussing the mandate of hiring of “5,000 additional 
Border Patrol Agents” and “500 Air & Marine Agents/Officers”). 
 226. See ACLU, EXECUTIVE ORDER “BORDER SECURITY AND IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT IMPROVEMENTS” 2 (2017), https://www.aclu.org/executive-order-
border-security-and-immigration-enforcement-improvements [https://perma.cc/ 
WL7Y-T86R]. 
The implementation of this EO may result in the removal of migrants 
without due process or judicial recourse; more frequent detention of 
migrants (including families with young children) without 
individualized determination and when not justified by exceptional 
circumstances; the separation of families without regard for their ties to 
the United States or the best interests of the child; an increased 
likelihood that undocumented individuals will be the victims of crime 
and violence, and denied equal access to justice due to fear of seeking 
assistance from local police; and the denial of a meaningful opportunity 
to make an asylum claim, resulting in violations of U.S. non-refoulement 
obligations. 
Id. 
 227. PROQUEST, https://search.proquest.com/ (follow “Change Databases” 
hyperlink; then expand “Global Newsstream” and check only “US Newsstream”; 
then select “Use Selected Database”; then follow “Advanced Search” hyperlink; then 
type “Travel Ban” (quotations not included) OR “Muslim Ban” (quotations 
included) in first text box; then select from the “Publication date” dropdown 
“Specific date range…”; then enter date range January 27, 2017–February 27, 2017; 
then select “Search” button) (last visited June 20, 2018). 
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U.S. media sources about the Border Security Executive Order 
between January 25, 2017 and February 25, 2017.228 
Additionally, since January 2017, much of the coverage of this 
Executive Order has centered on tough rhetoric by DHS and DOJ 
officials instead of actions by the Trump Administration along the 
southern border.229 Whether intentional or not, focusing on the 
speech versus the actions of government officials at the border 
effectively created a smoke screen, diverting attention away from 
questionable actions by officials that could be challenged in court.   
3. Tough Rhetoric on Border Security Aimed at Creating a Deterrent
Effect
One clear objective of the Border Security Executive Order and 
DHS Border Security Memo was to create a deterrent effect to 
discourage future illegal border crossings along the southern 
border.230 Furthering this goal, then DHS Secretary John Kelly and 
other high-ranking DHS officials made a series of statements in the 
spring of 2017 indicating that DHS would be implementing new 
policies first outlined in the Border Security Executive Order and 
DHS Border Security Memo.231 
One early example of this harsh rhetoric from Secretary Kelly 
was the proposed change in the processing of family units 
apprehended at the border. In a March 7, 2017, interview with CNN, 
Secretary Kelly confirmed a previous statement by a senior DHS 
official on March 4, 2017 that the agency was considering separating 
 228. Id. (follow “Change Databases” hyperlink; then expand “Global 
Newsstream” and check only “US Newsstream”; then select “Use Selected Database”; 
then follow “Advanced Search” hyperlink; then type “Border Security” and 
“Executive Order” (quotations included) in the first text box; then select from the 
“Publication date” dropdown “Specific date range…”; then enter date range January 
25, 2017–February 25, 2017; then select “Search” button) (last visited June 20, 
2018). 
 229. See Jessica Schneider & David Shortell, Sessions’ Agenda at DOJ Reflects 
Trump’s, Despite Rocky Relationship, CNN (Jan. 5, 2018, 6:15 PM), http://www.cnn.co 
m/2017/12/31/politics/doj-year-end-recap/index.html [https://perma.cc/4NSR- 
4ALA] (discussing Attorney General Jeff Sessions’ public statements committing to 
be tough on crime). 
230. Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 30, 2017). 
 231. Press Release, John Kelly, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Statement on 
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children from their parents at the border.232 This statement marked 
a significant departure from the policy of processing parents and 
children apprehended at the border as family units.233 Secretary 
Kelly justified the proposed change in policy because of its deterrent 
effect, stating, in part, “I’m considering [separating children from 
their parents], in order to deter more movement along this terribly 
dangerous network.”234  
Secretary Kelly’s statements on the possible separation of 
parents and minor children garnered considerable attention from 
the press. Between March 4, 2017, the date this proposed change was 
first announced by a senior DHS official, and April 30, 2017, 652 
stories were published in U.S. media sources.235 Following this 
increased scrutiny by the press, Secretary Kelly backtracked his 
earlier remarks at a meeting with Senate Democrats on March 26, 
2017, confirming that the DHS would not separate mothers and 
children at the border unless there was an extenuating reason, such 
as illness.236   
On December 21, 2017, the Washington Post reported that the 
Trump Administration was once again considering separating 
parents and minor children apprehended at the southern border.237 
 232. Danielle Diaz, Kelly: DHS is Considering Separating Undocumented Children 





235. PROQUEST, https://search.proquest.com/ (follow “Change Databases” 
hyperlink; then expand “Global Newsstream” and check only “US Newsstream”; 
then select “Use Selected Database”; then follow “Advanced Search” hyperlink; then 
type “Kelly” (quotations not included) AND “Family” (quotations not included) 
AND “Homeland Security” (quotations included) in the first text box; then select 
from the “Publication date” dropdown “Specific date range…”; then enter date 
range March 4, 2017–April 30, 2017; then select “Search” button) (last visited June 
20, 2018). 
 236. Tal Kopan, Kelly says DHS Won’t Separate Families at the Border, CNN, (Mar. 
29, 2017, 10:15 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/29/politics/border-families-
separation-kelly/index.html [https://perma.cc/6UQM-XQK2]. 
 237. Nick Miroff, To Curb Illegal Border Crossings, Trump Administration Weighs New 
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This proposal was once again met with considerable outcry, with a 
number of published news reports and opinion pieces criticizing this 
proposed action.238 While DHS has not issued a denial in response 
to the Washington Post story, to date, current DHS Secretary Kirstjen 
Nielsen has not approved this proposal or any other changes to the 
processing of family units apprehended at the border.239 
Another member of the Trump Administration known for his 
public statements supporting stronger border security is Attorney 
General Jeff Sessions.240 On October 12, 2017, Attorney General 
Sessions delivered a controversial speech to the Executive Office of 
Immigration Review in Falls Church, Virginia alleging rampant 
abuse of asylum laws.241 In his remarks, Attorney General Sessions 
claimed many immigrants apprehended at the border present a false 
claim for asylum as a means to enter the country, stating: 
We have a generous asylum policy that is meant to protect 
those who, through no fault of their own, cannot co-exist 
in their home country no matter where they go because of 
persecution based on fundamental things like their 
religion or nationality. Unfortunately, this system is 
currently subject to rampant abuse and fraud. And as this 
system becomes overloaded with fake claims, it cannot deal 
effectively with just claims. . . . The system is being gamed. 
 238. See, e.g., Priscilla Alvarez, Deterring Illegal Immigration by Separating Parents and 
Children, ATLANTIC (Dec. 27, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/ 
2017/12/trumps-plan-to-deter-immigrants-from-coming-to-the-unitedstates/54922 
1/ [https://perma.cc/28KS-T632]; Elizabeth Oglesby, Opinion, Taking Away Their 
Children Won’t Stop Central American Border Crossers, THE HILL (Jan. 2, 2018, 5:30 PM), 
http://thehill.com/opinion/immigration/367115-taking-away-their-children-won 
t-stop-central-american-border-crossers [https://perma.cc/FY7J-3RJG]. 
239. See Alvarez, supra note 238. 
 240. See, e.g., Seung Min Kim & Josh Gerstein, What Jeff Sessions Thinks About 
Immigration, Police & Terrorism, POLITICO (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.politico.com/ 
story/2017/01/jeff-sessions-views-attorney-general-233383 [https://perma.cc/2E3  
U-78GM]; Adam Serwer, Jeff Session’s Unqualified Praise for a 1924 Immigration Law, 
ATLANTIC (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/ 
2017/01/jeff-sessions-1924-immigration/512591/ [https://perma.cc/42X 2-
3LT6]; Sen. Jeff Sessions, Opinion: America Needs to Curb Immigration Flows, WASH. 
POST (Apr. 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/slow-the-
immigration-wave/2015/04/09/c6d8e3d4-dd52-11e4-a5001c5bb1d8ff6a_story.htm 
l?nid&utm_term=.04d5fda0128d [https://perma.cc/7DR9-R5ZX]. 
 241. Jeff Sessions, Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Remarks to Executive Office 
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The credible fear process was intended to be a lifeline for 
persons facing serious persecution. But it has become an 
easy ticket to illegal entry into the United States.242 
Attorney General Sessions was also critical of immigration 
attorneys who represent immigrants apprehended at the border in 
their credible fear interviews, stating: “We also have dirty 
immigration lawyers who are encouraging their otherwise unlawfully 
present clients to make false claims of asylum providing them with 
the magic words needed to trigger the credible fear process.”243 
These remarks were covered in a number of major news 
publications, including the Washington Post244 and the Wall Street 
Journal,245 and drew sharp criticism from immigration attorneys and 
advocates.246 However, this tough rhetoric has not yet led to any 
242. Id. 
243. Id. 
244. See Sari Horiwitz, Sessions Calls on Congress to Tighten Rules for Asylum Seekers, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-se 
curity/sessions-calls-on-congress-to-tighten-rules-for-people-seekingasylum/2017/1 
0/12/9a1c6c3e-af56-11e7-a908-a3470754bbb9_story.html [https://perma.cc/3KS 
3-H28R]; Nicole Lewis, Fact Checker: Sessions Claim that ‘Dirty Immigration Lawyers’ 
Encourage Clients to Cite ‘Credible Fear’, WASH. POST. (Oct. 26, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2017/10/26/sessions-cl 
aim-that-dirty-immigration-lawyers-encourage-clients-to-cite-credible-fear/ [https:/ 
/perma.cc/2TJL-4CF7]; Nickole Miller, Letter to the Editor: Jeff Sessions Claims About 




 245. See Alicia A. Caldwell, Sessions Expands on Trump Plan to Toughen Asylum 
Process, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 12, 2017, 6:25 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sessions-
expands-on-trump-plan-to-toughen-asylum-process-1507847158 [https://perma.cc 
/2MWM-39YD]; Aruna Viswanatha, Jeff Sessions to Face Questions on Immigration, Other 
Contentious Issues, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 18, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/jeff-sessions-set-to-face-questions-on-immigration-ot her-contentious-issues-
1508324401 [https://perma.cc/S8CJ-G673]. 
 246. See, e.g., Attorney General Derides the Role of Due Process in the American 
Asylum System, AILA (Oct. 12, 2017), http://www.aila.org/advo-media/press-
releases/2017/aila-attorney-general-derides-the-role-of-due [https://perma.cc/Z 
S6D-FRX7]; Amanda Holpuch, Leading Immigration Lawyer Condemns Sessions’ Attack 
on Asylum System, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 13, 2017, 4:00 PM), https://www.theguardian. 
com/us-news/2017/oct/13/jeff-sessions-asylum-immigration-annaluisa-padilla [htt 
ps://perma.cc/2C94-7YNR]; Stephen W. Manning & Michelle Mendez, Trump, 
Sessions Attack Immigration Lawyers in Latest Affront to Rule of Law, THE HILL (Oct. 18, 
2017, 6:40 AM), http://thehill.com/opinion/ immigration/355958-trump-
sessionss-latest-affront-to-rule-of-law-attack-immigration-lawyers [https://perma.cc/ 
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major significant policy changes in these areas. To date, the official 
policy of DHS is to process parents and minor children apprehended 
at the border as family units,247 and the Trump Administration has 
not reinstituted a formal policy of long-term family detention. 
Additionally, while issues continue to arise with prompt release of 
detainees in compliance with Judge Gee’s July 2015 order, the 
majority of family units who undergo and pass a credible fear 
screening at a family detention center are quickly processed and 
released in compliance with the Flores settlement.248 Although the 
Administration has criticized the “loopholes” created by the TVPRA, 
DHS has not taken any steps to eliminate protections under the 
TVPRA for unaccompanied minors who reunite with a parent in the 
U.S.249 Furthermore, according to the most recent available statistics, 
nearly 80 percent of immigrants apprehended at the border who 
underwent a credible fear interview had a positive finding of credible 
fear.250 
While DHS never implemented a formal policy of separating 
family units apprehended at the border, Secretary Kelly’s comments, 
combined with the language in the Border Security Executive Order 
and DHS Border Security Memo, created a temporary deterrent 
effect. FY 2017 saw a significant decrease in apprehensions along the 
7Y85-XDRJ]. 
 247. See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., UNITED STATES
BORDER PATROL SOUTHWEST FAMILY UNIT SUBJECT AND UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN
CHILDREN APPREHENSIONS FISCAL YEAR 2016, https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/ 
southwest-border-unaccompanied-children/fy-2016 [https://perma.cc/7HTD-
HN3E] (last visited June 20, 2018). 
 248. In a June 27, 2017, order granting, in part, Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce, 
Judge Gee referenced evidence presented by the United States government, 
confirming that 95 percent of individuals detained at the family detention centers 
in Dilley, Texas, Karnes, Texas, and Berks County, Pennsylvania were released 
within 20 days of detention. See Flores v. Sessions, CV 85-4544 DMG (AGRx) 
(C.D.C.A. June 27, 2017). 
 249. See Letter to Congressional Leaders Transmitting a Report on Immigration 
Principles and Policies, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 734 (Oct. 8, 2017). 
 250. According to recent statistics published by the United States Citizenship 
and Immigration Services Asylum Division, in FY 2017, 47,833 of the 62,757 cases 
(76.3%) that underwent a credible fear screening had a positive finding of credible 
fear. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., CREDIBLE FEAR 
WORKLOAD SUMMARY–FY 2017 TOTAL CASELOAD, https://www.uscis.gov/ 
sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Upcoming%20National%20Engagements/P
ED_CredibleFearandReasonableFearStatisticsandNationalityReport.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/WRQ4-3JFN] (last visited June 20, 2018). 
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southern border, with a dramatic decrease in apprehensions 
between February and June 2017.251 April 2017, in particular, 
marked a five-year low in apprehensions, with only 15,766 total 
apprehensions—roughly one-third of the apprehensions in April 
2016.252 By the fall of 2017, the deterrent effect had worn off, and 
southern border apprehensions were once again on the rise.253 
Considering that DHS has not yet implemented the procedures to 
separate parents and minor children apprehended as family units on 
the border, it is entirely possible that DHS hoped the recently leaked 
reports would recreate the deterrent effect seen in third quarter of 
FY 2017.  
C. Less Publicized Actions by the Trump Administration on the Southern 
Border 
Those who were apprehended at the southern border in FY 
2017 ultimately faced actions that, although less publicized, were just 
as harsh as the policies outlined in the Border Security Executive 
Order that never came to fruition. The sections below discuss three 
 251. FY 2017 saw the lowest number of Border Patrol apprehensions along the 
southern border, an indicator of total number of illegal crossings, in modern history 
with 303,916 total apprehensions for the year. See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT.,
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., CBP SW. BORDER TOTAL Apprehensions/Inadmissibles 
Statistics, https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/sw-border-migration [https://per 
ma.cc/265J-U3AE] (last visited June 20, 2018). Apprehensions decreased 
significantly in the five-month period from February to June 2017 with only 97,506 
apprehensions. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
SOUTHWEST BORDER MIGRATION FY 2017, https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/sw-
border-migration-fy2017 [https://perma.cc/RN7L-8AAS] (last visited June 20, 
2018). By way of comparison, in FY 2016, there were a total of 408,870 
apprehensions along the southern border, with 234,092 apprehensions between 
February and June of 2016. See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC., U.S. BORDER PATROL APPREHENSIONS/SEIZURE STATISTICS–FISCAL YEAR 2016, at 
4 (Jan. 2017), https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2017-
Jan/USBP%20Stats%20FY2016%20sector%20profile.pdf [https://perma.cc/W78 
P-Q5YE]. 
 252. In April 2016, there were a total of 48,502 apprehensions along the 
southern border. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. 
BORDER PATROL APPREHENSIONS/SEIZURE STATISTICS–FISCAL YEAR 2016, at 4 (Jan. 
2017), https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2017-Jan/USB 
P%20Stats%20FY2016%20sector%20profile.pdf [https://perma.cc/W78P-Q5YE]. 
In April 2017, there were a total of 15,766. Id. 
 253. By FY 2017 Q4, border apprehensions were on the rise, with a total of 
86,726 apprehensions between July 2017 and September 2017. Id. 
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of the actions taken by DHS Officials as part of the agency’s efforts 
to implement the Border Security Executive Order. Furthermore, 
they examine how the lack of media coverage and public 
engagement may have shaped legal advocacy and impacted litigation 
challenging these measures. 
1. Blanket Denial of Parole to Asylum Seekers
One troubling issue that has emerged along the southern 
border and other points of entry is the mass detention of asylum 
seekers who have established a credible fear of persecution.254 
Individuals without a valid visa who turn themselves in to a CBP or 
Border Patrol agent at a U.S. port of entry in order to request asylum 
are considered “arriving aliens,” and are subject to mandatory 
detention under INA § 235.255 However, under 8 C.F.R. § 212.5, 
arriving aliens may be, on a case-by-case basis, released on parole due 
to “urgent humanitarian reasons” or “a significant public benefit,” 
provided the aliens present neither a security risk nor a risk of 
absconding.256 Since 2009, the Obama Administration policy 
directive has been the official policy of DHS governing whether 
asylum seekers are released on parole.257 This policy states that the 
detention of arriving aliens who pass a credible fear interview is not 
in the public interest and recommends these asylum seekers be 
 254. HUM. RTS. FIRST, LIFELINE ON LOCKDOWN: INCREASED U.S. DETENTION OF
ASYLUM SEEKERS 8–13 (2016) [hereinafter HUM. RTS. FIRST, LIFELINE ON LOCKDOWN], 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/Lifeline-on-Lockdown_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZL8F-GBJF]. 
 255. See INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) (Supp. 2017). 
Under INA § 235, any arriving alien who is not admitted or paroled into the U.S., 
including asylum seekers who claim a credible fear of persecution at a U.S. port of 
entry, are ineligible for release on bond and subject to mandatory detention until 
an immigration judge issues a final determination to grant or deny asylum. See INA 
§ 235(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 (2017). Conversely, individuals who
enter the U.S. unlawfully without inspection who are apprehended within U.S. 
territory shortly after entry are eligible for a bond hearing before an immigration 
judge and release on bond after establishing credible fear of persecution under 8 
CFR § 1003.19. See INA § 235(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b); 8 CFR § 1003.19; see also Allegra 
Love, A Very Complicated Legal Explanation About ICE and Immigrants and Parole, 
MEDIUM (June 19, 2017), https://medium.com/@allegralove1/a-very-complicated-
legal-explanation-about-ice-and-immigrants-and-parole-ba9db3fe947a 
[https://perma.cc/956U-TVMX]. 
256. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b) (2017). 
257. ICE 2009 DIRECTIVE 11002.1, supra note 39. 
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released on parole.258 While the number of asylum seekers released 
on parole decreased following the 2014 Central American Migrant 
Crisis, many asylum applicants continued to be released on parole 
during the last two years of the Obama Administration after passing 
a credible fear interview.259 
Although the DHS Border Security Memo indicated that the 
2009 Obama Administration policy directive remained in effect with 
respect to parole of asylum applicants who had passed a credible fear 
interview,260 reports from detained asylum seekers and attorneys 
indicate this is not the case.261 On the contrary, the DHS under the 
Trump Administration appears to have adopted a blanket policy 
where it will no longer release asylum seekers on parole and instead 
will detain asylum applicants indefinitely while their asylum case is 
pending before an immigration judge.262 This change in policy, 
triggered by the Border Security Executive Order, has led to the 
prolonged detention of asylum seekers, creating serious barriers to 
due process (particularly access to legal representation) in 
immigration proceedings.263 A recent report by Human Rights First 
258. Id. at ¶ 6.2. 
 259. HUM. RTS. FIRST, LIFELINE ON LOCKDOWN, supra note 254, at 8–9, 13. The 
release of arriving alien asylum seekers who had a positive finding of credible fear 
decreased significantly after the Central American Minor Crisis in 2014. Id. at 13. In 
2012, 80 percent of arriving asylum seekers who passed their credible fear interview 
were released on parole, compared to the first three quarters of FY 2015 when only 
47 percent of arriving alien asylum seekers were released on bond. Id. 
260. See DHS Border Security Memo, supra note 214, at 8–9. 
261. See HUM. RTS. FIRST, JUDGE AND JAILER: ASYLUM SEEKERS DENIED PAROLE IN
WAKE OF TRUMP EXECUTIVE ORDER 6 (Sept. 2017) [hereinafter HUM. RTS. FIRST,
JUDGE AND JAILER], https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/hrf-
judge-and-jailer-final-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/NK4R-M6V7]. 
 262. In a September 2017 report, Human Rights First found that since the 
Border Security Executive Order and the DHS Border Security Memo were issued: 
ICE’s implementation of parole for arriving asylum seekers has shifted 
in many detention facilities across the country. In these detention 
locations, eligible asylum seekers were sometimes released from 
detention on parole during the end of the Obama Administration. Now 
they are rarely, if ever, released on parole. 
Id. 
 263. A 2017 Human Rights First report raised concerns that increased detention 
and directives in the DHS Border Security Memo to expedite asylum claims at 
detention facilities near the southern border “could deprive detained asylum 
seekers and other immigrants of the chance to secure legal counsel and gather 
evidence” in support of their asylum claim. HUM. RTS. FIRST, TILTED JUSTICE:
BACKLOGS GROW WHILE FAIRNESS SHRINKS IN U.S. IMMIGRATION COURTS 4 
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also found that in some jurisdictions asylum applicants voluntarily 
withdrew their asylum application and accepted a removal order 
because they did not want to be detained in jail-like conditions 
indefinitely.264 More recently, news outlets published a December 
14, 2017, DHS policy directive authorizing the indefinite detention 
of pregnant women.265 This change marks a major shift from the 
previous DHS policy to not detain pregnant women—save for cases 
of extraordinary circumstances—and to release pregnant women on 
parole.266 
While widespread denial of parole for arriving aliens seeking 
asylum has been commonplace since the Border Security Executive 
Order was first issued, no legal challenges were filed against this 
policy until July 28, 2017, approximately six months after President 
Trump signed the Executive Order.267 On this date, the New York 
Civil Liberties Union and IRAP filed a class action suit—on behalf of 
arriving alien asylum seekers detained at the Buffalo Federal 
Detention Facility in Bativa, New York—challenging DHS’s practice 
of indiscriminately denying parole to detainees at the facility.268 
In their amended petition and motion for injunctive relief, 
Plaintiffs alleged that DHS officials had failed to follow agency 
procedure outlined in the 2009 policy directive when making parole 
determinations for asylum seekers who had passed a credible fear 
determination.269 In support of their complaint, Plaintiffs cited 
(Sept. 2017), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/hrf-tilted-
justice-final%5B1%5D.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PFR-V6B9]. 
264. HUM. RTS. FIRST, JUDGE AND JAILER, supra note 261, at 4. 
 265. Rafael Bernal, ICE Will Detain Pregnant Women, Ending Previous Policy, THE
HILL (Mar. 29, 2018), http://thehill.com/latino/380827-ice-will-detain-pregnant-
women-ending-previous-policy [https://perma.cc/N8WG-6MKK]. 
266. See Memorandum from Thomas Homan, Exec. Assoc. Dir., U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enf’t, to Field Office Directors et. al. (Aug. 15, 2016), 
https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Document/2016/11032.2_Id
entificationMonitoringPregnantDetainees.pdf [https://perma.cc/DQ87-AE9A]. 
 267. See Kimberly J. Winbush, Issuance of Presidential Executive Orders Concerning 
Immigration or Immigrants, 25 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 2 (2017) (discussing cases 
addressing challenges and/or interpretations of presidential executive orders that 
relate to immigration and related issues such as rights of aliens or citizenship or 
limitaitons on the issuance of passports and visas). 
 268. See generally Lawsuit Challenges Unlawful Detention of Asylum-Seekers at Buffalo 
Immigration Jail, ACLU (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/news/lawsuit-challe 
nges-unlawful-detention-asylum-seekers-buffalo-immigration-jail [https://perma. 
cc/WR49-37K2]. 
269. See Plaintiffs’ Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus & Complaint 
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statistics offered by DHS showing that between January and July 
2017, parole grant rates at the Bativa facility plummeted from 50 
percent to between 12–14 percent.270 On November 17, 2017, Judge 
Elizabeth A. Wolford in the Western District of New York granted 
the petitioners’ motion for a preliminary injunction and denied the 
government’s motion to dismiss.271 Under the order, asylum seekers 
are to be given a parole interview with an immigration officer, 
provided with an explanation for their parole decision, and 
informed that they can seek reconsideration if parole is initially 
denied.272 The injunction also provides asylum seekers who have 
already had their parole denied with the opportunity to have their 
parole requests readjudicated,273 and orders bond hearings for those 
detained at Batavia for six months or more.274 However, unlike the 
preliminary injunctions that blocked enforcement of the Travel Ban 
nationwide, Judge Wolford’s order is limited to the Western District 
of New York.275 
2. Increase in Criminal Prosecution of Asylum Seekers as Illegal
Entrants and Use of Criminal Prosecution for Immigration
Violations to Separate Family Units
Another enforcement goal set forth in the Border Security 
Executive Order was increased criminal prosecution for 
immigration violations.276 Though criminal prosecution for 
immigration violations has accounted for a large number of total 
federal prosecutions annually for at least a decade, the Trump 
Administration has claimed to prioritize the DOJ’s efforts to 
criminally prosecute immigration violations.277 
for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 23, Abdi v. Duke, 2017 WL 5599521 (W.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 17, 2017) (No. 17-cv-0721-EAW). 
 270. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law at 5, Abdi v. Duke, 2017 WL 5599521 
(W.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2017) (No. 1:17-cv-0721-EAW). 
271. Abdi v. Duke, 2017 WL 5599521, at *29 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2017). 
272. Id. at *28. 
273. Id. 
274. Id. 
275. See id. 
276. Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 30, 2017). 
277. While the Trump Administration did prioritize prosecution for 
immigration violations, the total number of prosecutions and convictions for 
criminal immigration violations was approximately 14 percent lower in FY 2017 than 
FY 2016. See Criminal Immigration Prosecutions Down 14% in FY 2017, TRAC REPORTS 
(Dec. 6, 2017), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/494/[https://perma.cc/ 
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After the Bush Administration established the “Operation 
Streamline” program in 2005,278 criminal prosecution for illegal 
entry (a federal misdemeanor) and illegal reentry (a federal felony) 
have accounted for a significant percentage of total annual 
prosecutions by the DOJ.279 Prosecution for illegal entry and reentry 
peaked during the Obama Administration with nearly 100,000 
criminal convictions in 2013.280 Toward the end of the Obama 
Administration, between FY 2014 and FY 2016, criminal prosecution 
of immigration violations decreased281 and enforcement focused 
primarily on prosecuting those who reentered the U.S. after prior 
removal.282 
On April 11, 2017, several months President Trump signed the 
Border Security Executive Order, Attorney General Sessions issued 
HQ2J-7YDW]. In FY 2017, there were a total of 59,910 prosecutions for criminal 
immigration violations and in FY 2016 there were a total of 69,636 criminal 
immigration prosecutions, including 64,297 prosecutions for illegal entry and 
reentry. See id.; see also Immigration Now 52 Percent of all Federal Immigration Prosecutions, 
TRAC REPORTS (Nov. 28, 2016) [hereinafter TRAC REPORT FY 2016], 
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/446/ [https://perma.cc/7M95-8WVT]. The 
reduction in the number of prosecutions and convictions for illegal reentry and 
illegally entry is likely due to the significantly lower number of apprehensions along 
the southern border in FY 2017. See supra note 251 and accompanying text. 
 278. Operation Streamline was launched in December 2005 by the Bush 
Administration. See Bryan Schatz, A Day in the “Assembly-Line” Court That Prosecutes 70 
Border Crossers in 2 Hours, MOTHER JONES (July 21, 2017, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/07/a-day-in-the-assembly-line-court-
that-sentences-46-border-crossers-in-2-hours/# [https://perma.cc/5MJ9-KZW5]. 
Under the program, DHS designated target enforcement areas within a Border 
Patrol sector and referred virtually all apprehended unauthorized persons in these 
areas for speedy prosecution for the misdemeanor crime of illegal entry or the 
felony crime of illegal reentry. Id. Since implementation of Operation Streamline, 
convictions for illegal entry and illegal reentry have skyrocketed, accounting for a 
majority of federal criminal convictions. Id. 
 279. See At Nearly 100,000, Immigration Prosecutions Reach All-Time High in FY 2013, 
TRAC REPORTS, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/336/ [https://perma 
.cc/P4S7-8G9R] (last visited June 20, 2018). 
280. Id. 
281. See TRAC REPORT FY 2016, supra note 277. 
282. Under previous Administrations, many individuals who were prosecuted 
after reentry were initially charged with the more serious felony charge of illegal 
reentry, but were allowed to plead guilty to the reduced charge of illegal entry, a 
petty misdemeanor. See Despite Rise in Felony Charges, Most Immigration Convictions 
Remain Misdemeanors, TRAC REPORTS, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/ 
356/ [https://perma.cc/L9S4-W5UB] (last visited June 20, 2018); see also Schatz, 
supra note 278. 
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a policy memorandum directing federal prosecutors to prioritize 
prosecution of criminal immigration violations.283 In particular, the 
DOJ policy memorandum directed prosecutors to pursue felony 
charges for those reentering the U.S. and to resume criminal 
prosecution against first-time entrants.284 
In the months following the DOJ policy memorandum, 
prosecutions for illegal entry and reentry increased dramatically. By 
May 2017, criminal prosecutions had increased by 27 percent,285 and 
by June 2017, they had increased by another 18 percent.286 FY 2017 
also saw aggressive prosecution of first-time entrants, including 
asylum seekers.287 Border Patrol often apprehended and referred 
these entrants to the DOJ for criminal prosecution before the 
entrants had undergone credible fear screening.288 There were also 
reports that many individuals who had been criminally convicted for 
illegal entry were processed for removal by DHS before the 
individuals were able to present their asylum claim.289 
 283. Memorandum from Jeff Sessions, Att’y Gen., to all Federal Prosecutors, 
Renewed Commitment to Criminal Immigration Enforcement (Apr. 11, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/956841/download [https://perm 
a.cc/GT5Z-H9YW].
284. Id.; see Astrid Galvan, More Border Crossers Prosecuted in ‘New Era’ of
Enforcement, CHICAGO TRIB. (Nov. 5, 2017, 1:09 PM), http://www.chicagotribune. 
com/news/nationworld/ct-border-crossing-prosecutions-20171105-story.html  [htt 
ps://perma.cc/2GT7-DG5K]. 
 285. Immigration Prosecutions for May 2017, TRAC REPORTS, http://trac.syr.edu/ 
tracreports/bulletins/immigration/monthlymay17/fil/ [https://perma.cc/95PB-
DLDM] (last visited June 20, 2018) (stating that the number of “new immigration 
prosecutions . . . . is up 26.8 percent over the previous month”). 
 286. Immigration Prosecutions for June 2017, TRAC REPORTS, https://trac.syr.edu/  
tracreports/bulletins/immigration/monthlyjun17/fil/ [https://perma.cc/HM4Q-
FZJW] (last visited June 20, 2018) (“[D]uring June 2017 the government reported 
5508 new immigration prosecutions . . . up 18.4 percent over the previous month.”). 
 287. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. BORDER 
PATROL’S TUCSON SECTOR PROSECUTING FIRST­TIME OFFENDERS (July 13, 2017), 
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/us-border-patrol-s-tucson-sec 
tor-prosecuting-first-time-offenders [https://perma.cc/Z6D6-7JCX]. 
 288. HUM. RTS. FIRST, THE RISE IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS OF ASYLUM SEEKERS 2
(2017), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/hrf-criminal-prosecut 
ion-of-asylum-seekers.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9XR-EJNU] (stating that in Tucson, 
“clients report having a fear to return to their home countries or intend to seek 
asylum, but Streamline judges routinely tell attorneys that their clients must first be 
criminally prosecuted and serve their prison sentences.”). 
 289. Prosecuting and removing asylum seekers before they have an opportunity 
to pursue their asylum claims potentially violate the United States’ non-refoulement 
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Even more troubling, in November 2017, the Houston 
Chronicle confirmed twenty-two instances in which the DOJ and the 
DHS used criminal prosecution for immigration violations to 
separate family units entering the United States to seek asylum.290 
Federal public defenders and legal advocates state that this number 
is likely much higher.291 In one case, Nayron Pineda, who fled 
Venezuela in May 2017 with his wife and fifteen-year-old daughter, 
handed the Border Patrol agent paperwork to request asylum when 
he and his family were apprehended.292 Instead of referring their 
case for a credible fear screening and processing them as a family 
unit, Mr. Pineda’s fifteen-year-old daughter was transferred to ORR 
custody while he and his wife were prosecuted for illegal entry.293 
After serving their sentence, the couple was transferred to an 
immigration detention facility to make their case for asylum.294 
During this time, Pineda and his wife were denied custody of their 
daughter, who was eventually released to the custody of her aunt.295 
obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention, and 1967 Protocol that prohibit 
returning an individual to a country where they would face persecution. See 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 
[hereinafter 1951 Refugee Convention]; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 
art. 33, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 268 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol] 
(“No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion.”). 
 290. Lomi Kriel, Trump Moves to End ‘Catch and Release’, Prosecuting Parents and 
Removing Children who Cross Border, HOUSTON CHRON. (Nov. 25, 2017) [hereinafter 
Kriel, Trump Moves to End ‘Catch and Release’], http://www.houstonchronicle.com/ 
news/houston-texas/houston/article/Trump-moves-to-end-catch-and-release-1238 
3666.php [https://perma.cc/S5QE-4S4U]. 
 291. A November 25, 2017 Houston Chronicle story notes that “[f]ederal 
defense attorneys across the southern border say they are fielding unprecedented 
requests from migrant clients to find their children.” Id. The story also contains 
quotes from Laura St. John, legal director of the Florence Project, an Arizona 
nonprofit serving unaccompanied children, noting that St. John’s office had seen 
nearly 100 cases of parents separated from their minor children when the parents 
were prosecuted for illegal entry. Id. 
 292. Lomi Kriel, Streamlined: Trump Pressing for Mass Criminalization of Illegal 
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While it is unclear exactly how widespread the problem is, these 
anecdotal reports sharply conflict with the DHS policy to not 
separate family units that then DHS Secretary Kelly announced in 
April 2017.296 
To date, there has been one significant legal challenge to the 
prosecution of parents apprehended and separated from their 
minor children. On November 7, 2017, the Federal Public Defender 
for the Western District of Texas in El Paso, Texas, filed a joint 
motion on behalf of five defendants to dismiss federal misdemeanor 
charges for illegal entry.297 In support of their motion, Defendants 
argued that the government’s criminal prosecution of asylum 
seekers, separation of asylum seekers from their minor children, and 
failure to process asylum seekers and their children as family units 
in compliance with the Flores settlement, violated their Due Process 
rights.298 Despite expressing serious concerns about the increased 
number of defendants prosecuted for misdemeanor illegal entry 
who were separated from their children at the time of their arrest,299 
U.S. Magistrate Judge Miguel Torres denied Defendants’ motion to 
dismiss on November 27, 2017.300 The Federal Public Defender for 
the Western District of Texas indicated the defendants would appeal 
the ruling by Judge Torres.301 
On December 11, 2017, eight organizations filed a formal 
complaint with the DHS Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 
and DHS Inspector General regarding the use of prosecution for 
illegal reentry to separate family units apprehended at or near the 
296. See Kriel, Trump Moves to End ‘Catch and Release’, supra note 290. 
 297. See Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support Thereof, United 
States v. Dominguez Portillo, No. 17-MJ-4409-MAT (W.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2007). 
298. Id. at *3. 
299. In his November 1, 2017 Order, U.S. Magistrate Judge Torres noted: 
The Court, in a number of recent illegal entry cases over the last several 
months, has repeatedly been appraised of concerns voiced by defense 
counsel and by defendants regarding their limited and often non-
existent lack of information about the well-being and whereabouts of 
their minor children from whom they were separated at the time of their 
arrest. 
Order for Briefing, United States v. Dominguez Portillo, EP-17-MJ-4409-MAT, at *1 
(W.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2017). 
 300. Lomi Kriel, El Paso Judge Denies Motion of Immigrant Parents Separated from 
Children, HOUSTON CHRON. (Nov. 27, 2017), http://www.chron.com/news/ 
houston-texas/houston/article/El-Paso-judge-denies-motion-of-immigrant-parents-
12387509.php [https://perma.cc/TR8S-JRWQ] (last visited June 20, 2018). 
301. Id. 
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U.S.-Mexico border.302 In the complaint, the Florence Immigration 
and Refugee Rights Project, one of the signatory organizations, 
identified 155 cases of family separation that had occurred as of late 
October 2017, with most of these cases occurring during the late 
summer and fall of 2017.303 Lutheran Immigration and Refugee 
Service, another signatory organization that provides temporary 
shelter and sponsor placement services for unaccompanied minors 
in ORR custody, also reported a significant increase in minors who 
were separated from a parent following apprehension at the border 
in the last quarter of FY 2017.304 These reports from organizations 
working on the ground to assist family units apprehended at the 
border indicate that this issue may be more widespread than 
originally thought.305 
3. Customs and Border Protection and Border Patrol Officers
Turning Away Asylum Seekers at the Southern Border
While not specifically directed by the Border Security Executive 
Order, another trend that has emerged involves CBP and Border 
Patrol agents turning away those who present themselves at the 
border to request asylum. According to a May 2017 report by Human 
Rights First, after the election of President Trump and his signing of 
the Border Security Executive Order, CBP agents have routinely 
refused to process asylum seekers and, in some cases, claimed the 
United States is no longer accepting asylum seekers.306  
 302. The eight organizations that filed the joint formal complaint were: Al Otro 
Lado, American Immigration Council, American Immigration Lawyers Association, 
Florence Immigrant and Refugee Rights Project, Kids in Need of Defense, Lutheran 
Immigration & Refugee Service, Refugee & Immigrant Center for Education & 
Legal Services, and Women’s Refugee Commission. Letter from Al Otro Lado et. 
al., to Cameron Quinn, Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, Dept. of 
Homeland Sec., and John V. Kelly, Acting Inspector General, Dept. of Homeland 
Sec. (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/ 
default/files/general_litigation/family_separation_complaint.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/DG89-SNXE]. 
303. Id. at 5–6. 
304. Id. at 6. 
305. Id. at 18. 
306. See B. SHAW DRAKE ET AL., HUM. RTS. FIRST, CROSSING THE LINE: U.S. BORDER




Pottratz Acosta: Sunlight is the Best Disinfectant: The Role of the Media in Shapi
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2018
  
864 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:3 
Some of the reported conduct by CBP and Border Patrol agents 
is particularly egregious, and indicates that, under the Trump 
Administration, officers feel emboldened to reject asylum applicants 
presenting a claim of fear at the border, in violation of both U.S. and 
international law.307 In several reported cases, CBP and Border 
Patrol agents have told asylum seekers, “Trump says we don’t have to 
let you in”308 and, “There’s no asylum here. We’re not granting 
asylum.”309 In other cases, CBP and Border Patrol agents have 
threatened to separate parents from their children if they pursue an 
asylum claim.310 According to one attorney representing asylum 
seekers on the U.S. border near Tijuana, “The tenor of interactions 
with C.B.P. officers has veered toward the openly hostile following 
[President Trump’s] election.”311 
On July 12, 2017, the AIC and Center for Constitutional Rights 
filed a class action lawsuit challenging CBP’s unlawful practice of 
turning away asylum seekers who present themselves at a port of 
entry along the U.S.-Mexico border.312 In support of their November 
13, 2017, motion for class certification, Plaintiffs submitted affidavits 
from the individual plaintiffs313 and nineteen asylum seekers314 who 
had been turned back by a CBP officer after attempting to apply for 
asylum at the border. The affidavits detailed unlawful conduct by the 
 307. The act of turning away an individual seeking protection on account of a 
well-founded fear of persecution violates INA § 235, which requires the acceptance 
and processing of asylum seeker with a credible fear of persecution apprehended at 
the border. See INA § 235(b)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B) (Supp. 2017). It also 
violates the United States’ treaty obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention, 
and the 1967 Protocol. See 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 289; 1967 Protocol, 
supra note 289. 
308. B. SHAW DRAKE ET. AL., supra note 306. 
 309. Caitlin Dickerson & Miriam Jordan, ‘No Asylum Here’: Some Say U.S. Border 
Agents Rejected Them, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05  
/03/us/asylum-border-customs.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/335C-P7LC]. 
310. Richard Gonzalez, Advocates Say Agents are Unlawfully Turning Away Asylum 
Seekers at the Border, NPR NEWS (July 26, 2017, 12:16 PM), https://www.npr.org/201 
7/07/26/539496312/advocates-say-agents-are-unlawfully-turning-away-asylum-seek 
ers-at-the-border [https://perma.cc/J93H-ZAR2]. 
311. Dickerson & Jordan, supra note 309. 
 312. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, at 1–3, Al Otro Lado v. 
Duke, No. 2:17-cv-5111 (C.D.C.A. July 12, 2017). 
313. Declaration of Abigail Doe in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion at 1–3, Al Otro 
Lado v. Duke, No. 2:17-cv-5111 (C.D.C.A. Nov. 13, 2017). 
 314. Declaration in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion at 1–3, Al Otro Lado v. Duke, 
No. 2:17-cv-5111 (C.D.C.A. Nov. 13, 2017). 
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CBP officers, including falsely representing to individuals that 
asylum is no longer available in the United States, that asylum 
seekers need permission from the Mexican government to seek 
asylum, or that asylum seekers must apply for asylum at other ports 
of entry.315 In the case of one of the individual plaintiffs, she was 
threatened and falsely told that if she did not abandon her effort to 
obtain asylum, she would lose custody of her children.316 The 
government’s motion to transfer venue to the U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of California was granted on November 21, 
2017, dismissing all pending motions without prejudice, and 
requiring Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification and the 
government’s motion to dismiss be refiled.317 The case is currently 
pending in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
California.318 
While the significant decrease in southern border 
apprehensions in FY 2017 is likely due in large part to the deterrent 
effect created by the Border Security Executive Order and Secretary 
Kelly’s comments about separating family units at the border, one 
cannot help but wonder if CBP’s reported turn backs of asylum 
seekers also contributed to the historically low apprehensions in FY 
2017. 
4. Limited Media Coverage of Border Security Enforcement Measures
Compared to the first Travel Ban, there was virtually no media 
coverage of the three actions to implement the Border Security 
Executive Order, described above.319 Between January 25, 2017 and 
December 1, 2017, U.S. news outlets only published thirty-three 
stories covering the blanket denial of parole and mass detention of 
asylum seekers under the Border Security Executive Order.320 
315. Id. 
 316. Declaration of Abigail Doe in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion, supra note 313, 
at 4. 
317. Challenging Customs and Border Protection’s Unlawful Practice of Turning Away 
Asylum Seekers, AIC, https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/litigation/chall 
enging-customs-and-border-protections-unlawful-practice-turning-away-asylum-seek 
ers [https://perma.cc/EA8C-Q3W3] (last visited June 20, 2018). 
 318. Case Profile: Al Otro Lado v. Kelly, CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, 
https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15991 [https://perma.cc/WW82-A 
CQV] (last visited June 20, 2018). 
319. See supra Part III.2.B. 
320. ProQuest, https://search.proquest.com/ (follow “Change Databases” 
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Despite the serious harm caused by increased criminal 
prosecution of first-time entrants for illegal entry—both individuals 
and family units seeking asylum—news coverage of this issue was 
relatively modest. Between April 11, 2017—the date of Attorney 
General Sessions’ policy memorandum to federal prosecutors—and 
December 1, 2017, U.S. news outlets published 392 stories on 
criminal prosecution for illegal entry and illegal reentry.321 The 
instances of CBP turning back asylum seekers also received limited 
coverage in the press, with only 135 stories published in U.S. news 
outlets between January 25, 2017 and December 1, 2017.322 
IV. CONCLUSION
While there is no direct evidence of causation, evidence suggests 
a correlation between media coverage, or lack thereof, and litigation 
challenging the Trump Administration’s executive actions on 
immigration. One key example of the link between increased media 
coverage and positive impact on legal challenges to immigration 
policy is the speed of legal proceedings. As noted above, the first 
Travel Ban, implemented under intense and pervasive media 
scrutiny, was halted almost immediately through a series of 
nationwide injunctions, culminating in a published Ninth Circuit 
decision upholding the TRO in Washington v. Trump.323 This decision 
hyperlink; then expand “Global Newsstream” and check only “US Newsstream”; 
then select “Use Selected Database”; then follow “Advanced Search” hyperlink; then 
type “Border Security” AND “Asylum” AND “Parole” in the first text box (quotations 
included); then select from the “Publication date” dropdown “Specific date 
range…”; then enter date range January 25, 2017–December 1, 2017; then select 
“Search” button) (last visited June 20, 2018). 
 321. Id. (follow “Change Databases” hyperlink; then expand “Global 
Newsstream” and check only “US Newsstream”; then select “Use Selected Database”; 
then follow “Advanced Search” hyperlink; then type “Operation Streamline” AND 
“Prosecution” AND “Illegal Entry” OR “Illegal Reentry” in the first text box 
(quotations included); then select from the “Publication date” dropdown “Specific 
date range…”; then enter date range April 11, 2017–December 1, 2017; then select 
“Search” button) (last visited June 20, 2018). 
 322. Id. (follow “Change Databases” hyperlink; then expand “Global 
Newsstream” and check only “US Newsstream”; then select “Use Selected Database”; 
then follow “Advanced Search” hyperlink; then type “Asylum” AND “Turn Back” 
AND “Border Patrol” in the first text box (quotations not included); then select 
from the “Publication date” dropdown “Specific date range…”; then enter  date 
range January 25, 2017–December 1, 2017; then select “Search” button) (last visited 
June 20, 2018). 
323. See supra Part III.A.2. 
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was issued a mere two weeks after the Travel Ban was signed by 
President Trump.324 By way of comparison, in Abdi v. Duke, the case 
challenging the DHS’ blanket policy of denying detained asylum 
seekers release on parole,325 District Court Judge Wolford granted 
Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction approximately two 
months after it was filed with the court.326 Additionally, Judge 
Wolford’s order was not a nationwide injunction and only applied to 
class members detained at the Batavia Detention Facility near 
Buffalo, New York.327 
In the case of Al Otro Lado v. Duke, the class action litigation 
challenging the rejection of asylum seekers by CBP and Border 
Patrol agents, Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint on July 12, 
2017.328 On November 21, 2017, Defendants’ motion to transfer 
venue to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
California was granted, dismissing all pending motions without 
prejudice, and requiring Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification and 
Defendants’ motion to dismiss be refiled.329 The speed of 
proceedings has a huge effect on the individuals impacted by the 
specific executive order or agency action,330 and available evidence 
suggests there is a correlation between the amount of media 
coverage a case receives and the speed of judicial proceedings.331 
Even more important is the complimentary role of investigative 
journalism in identifying unlawful actions by DHS officials and 
building the factual record supporting a legal cause of action 
challenging DHS policies. A clear example of this is the investigative 
reporting by the Houston Chronicle publishing the stories of Central 
American parents who were separated from their children after 
being apprehended by CBP agents and prosecuted for illegal 
entry.332 This reporting by the Houston Chronicle was cited in the 
December 11, 2017, formal complaint to the DHS Officer for Civil 
324. See id. 
325. Abdi v. Duke, No. 17-cv-721 EAW (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2017). 
326. See supra Part III.C.1. 
327. Id. 
328. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 312, at 1–3. 
329. See supra Part III.C.3. 
330. See supra Part III.A.3. 
331. See id. 
332. See supra Part III.C.2. 
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Rights and Civil Liberties and DHS Inspector General, and provided 
key factual background information in support of the complaint.333 
Directly related to this is the role of media coverage in sparking 
public outcry in support of or against a particular policy.334 The 
widespread publication of the Alan Kurdi photo caused an 
immediate shift in public attitude surrounding the Syrian Refugee 
Crisis.335 Images of chaos at the airports and reports of lawful 
permanent residents being denied entry into the U.S. sparked 
nationwide protests and outrage in opposition to the Travel Ban.336 
But if there is limited or no media coverage of the harm caused by 
government action, the public will not be informed and thus will not 
be able to demand action from our elected officials to right these 
wrongs. To prevent ongoing and future abuses against 
disenfranchised populations, such as immigrants and refugees, it is 
critical that the press continues to give a voice to the voiceless and 
illuminate injustice all around us. 
The press, attorneys and the public have always played an 
important role in holding government officials accountable.337 The 
unprecedented actions of the Trump Administration have only 
magnified the importance of these roles.338 The press must continue 
to shine a light on actions by our government, attorneys must 
continue to challenge unlawful actions by our government on behalf 
of those who have been harmed, and the public must stay engaged 
and express opposition to actions that threaten the most vulnerable 
among us. 
333. See id. 
334. See supra Part III.B.2. 
335. See supra Part II.B. 
336. See supra Part III.A.2. 
337. See supra Part III.A.3. 
338. See id. 
66
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 2
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol44/iss3/2
 
Mitchell Hamline Law Review 
The Mitchell Hamline Law Review is a student-edited journal. Founded in 1974, the Law 
Review publishes timely articles of regional, national and international interest for legal 
practitioners, scholars, and lawmakers. Judges throughout the United States regularly 
cite the Law Review in their opinions. Academic journals, textbooks, and treatises 
frequently cite the Law Review as well. It can be found in nearly all U.S. law school 




© Mitchell Hamline School of Law 
875 Summit Avenue, Saint Paul, MN 55105 
mitchellhamline.edu 
67
Pottratz Acosta: Sunlight is the Best Disinfectant: The Role of the Media in Shapi
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2018
